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INTRODUCTION 
Recently the trend of the law towards involvement in 
. the area of mental retardation has resulted in the courts' 
evaluating and specifying treatment for the mentally retarded. 
In a landmark case, Wyatt v. Stickney, 1 establishing judic-
ial review of the question of adequacy of treatment, Judge 
Johnson said: 
Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally 
required because, absent treatment, the hospital is 
transformed "into a penitentiary where one could be 
held indefinitely for no convicted offense •.. The 
purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treatment 
purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care 
or punishrnent ... In the context of the right to 
appropriate care ... no viable distinction can be made 
between the mentally ill and the mentally retarded. 
Persons committed to mental health facilities shall 
be afforded adequate treatment.LEmphasis added..=/ 
"Shall" is a strong word, rarely used in psychological 
literature but frequently in the law. It is difficult to 
1 325 F.Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. N.D. 1971} quoting from 
Ragsdale v. Overholser, 108 U.S. App. D.C. 308, 281 F.2d 943, 
950 (1960) . (Wyatt was the first case to hold that both the 
mentally ill and the mentally retarded were entitled to ade-
quate treatment. A mentally retarded patient':s right to due 
process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the U.S. Constitution is violated when the state confines 
a patient on the "altruistic theory" that he must receive 
treatment and then fails to provide it.} 
2 
determine to what extent "shalls" can be legislated or 
judicially determined where human conditions are involved. 
Judge David Bazelon, author of an early court decision 
2 
ruling that the mentally disabled have a right to treatment, 
calls for an interdisciplinary approach to the problem of 
appropriate treatment. 3 Professionals in the field of z:etara-
a~i~n~--attorneys,4 legislators, judges, psychologists, soc+ 
ial workers and those in special education--are concerned 
with the relationship between new concepts in the area of 
mental retardation and the current legal controversies. 
2Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967) 
(Failure of a state mental health facility to provide treat-
ment to a person involuntarily committed was contrary to the 
requirements of the 1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill 
Act, D.C. Code Ann. §21-501 (1966) mandating treatment for 
"persons hospitalized in a public hospital for mental ill-
ness". His opinion and a concurring opinion by Judge Fahy 
suggest that even without this statutory mandate, a person 
has a constitutional right to adequate treatment under the 
due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution or the prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment of the Eighth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution. 
3 
Bazelon,D., The Mental Disability Law Reporter, 1 
(June-July, 1976) I. The Journal is a publication of the 
American Bar Association Commission on the Mentally Disabled. 
It reviews case law, leg,tslati0n and· regulations, and 
articles. It also lists major works on mental disability law 
and the activities of the ABA Commission. It is designed for 
attorneys and judges as well as all persons working in and 
affected by the . mental disability system. 
4 
The American Bar Association, in establishing the 
Commission on the Mentally Disabled, recommended that state 
associations follow suit. In 1976 the Oregon Board of Bar 
Governors established an Oregon Committee for the Rights of 
the Mentally Disabled, which began meeting in January, 1977. 
3 
Habilitation for the mentally retarded and evaluation of the 
effectiveness of the effort, traditionally the domain of 
5 
psychology, is now an established justiciable area. Mental 
retardation is a theoretical and practical issue for the law 
and psychology, from definition to treatment. 
Definitions and classification of the mentally retarded 
have developed with legal, medical, educational and psycho-
. 6 
logical facets. Treatment of the mentally retarded is both 
the province of psychologists and of the courts. Also ade-
quacy or effectiveness of treatment, always a concern of 
clinical psychologists and psychological research, is a jus-
ticiable question for which the courts are seeking evaluation 
measures. Communication between the two professions as both 
consider mental retardation will facilitate the goals of 
both--serving the best interests of the mentally retarded 
citizen. 
5 
Justiciable: a controversy appropriate for judicial 
review. The right to treatment was first addressed in a 
legal position paper by Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 
American Bar Association Journal, 1960, 46, 499 and has 
been recognized in landmark cases, Rousev. Cameron (summar-
ized in note 2) and Wyatt v. Stickney (summarized in note 1). 
6 
There are considerable problems in the definition and 
classification of .mental retardation seen by psychology and 
the law . . New trends in psychology are away from classifica-
tion. The trend in the law is to classify. The problem, 
psychologically and legally, of labeling is an issue in 
itself, not to be reviewed in this paper but briefly dis-
cussed in Chapter III. The interested reader may consult the 
growing literature on this subject. See Robinson,N.M. & 
Robinson,H.B., The MentallV Retarded Child: A Psychological 
Approach. New York: M_cGraw-~i11, 1976. 
4 
The purpose of this thesis is to review the legal right to 
treatment7 and current theory regarding treatment of the 
mentally retarded and discuss implications for mental retard-
ation considering current legal trends and psychological theory. 
7Different legal rubrics have been used in several 
cases--"protection from harm," "right to treatment" and "need 
for care" and right to"normalization and habilitation,"There 
have been significant judicial decisions in the field recent-
ly. "Habilitatd..on" is a more inclusive term meaning the 
process by which the staff of the institution assist the 
resident to acquire and maintain those life skills which 
enable him to cope more effectively with the demands of his 
own person and of his environment and to raise the level of 
his physical, mental and social efficiency. Habilitation 
includes but is not limited to programs of formal, structured 
education and treatment. wiatt v. Stickney, supra, App. A. 
In New York State Association for Retarded Children,Inc. v. 
Carey, 393 F.Supp. 715, 718(E.D. N.Y. 1975) Judge Judd notes 
that the consent judgment reflects the "fact that protection 
from harm requires relief more extensive than this court 
originally contemplated, because harm can result not only 
from neglect but from conditions which cause regression or 
which prevent development of an individual's capabilities." 
In Donaldson v •.. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 527 (5th Cir. 1974) 
vacated 422 u.s. 957 (1975), the court held that "where a 
nondangerous patient is involuntarily civilly committed to a 
state. mental hospital such a patient has a constitutional 
right to such treatment as will help him to be cured or to 
improve his mental condition". In Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 
F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) the court upheld the lower court 
rulings that there is a "right to treatment" for civilly 
committed mentally retarded persons. It held that persons 
in institutions for the mentally handicapped were entitled 
to constitutional minimum quality of care and treatment even 
if their confinement was justified only b~ the "need for 
care." 503 F.2d 1313. See also Welsh v. Likens, 373 F.Supp. 
487 CD.Minn, 1974); Davis v. Watkins, 384 F.Supp. 1196 
(N, D. Ohio 197 4) • 
Five :areas at'e covered ; 
ll a review· of legal and ps.ychologica,l history, def-
initions and classifications of ment~l retardation; 
5 
2) current theory, applications, research and evalua-
tion methods regarding treatment for the mentally retarded; 
3} an overview of conunitment and civil rights laws as 
they affect habilitation of mentally retarded; 
4) the legal right to adequate treatment/habilitation--
a review of the constitutional and other legal bases for 
treatment, and judicial involvement in evaluating adequacy; 
and 
5) conclusions, including: a) review of the legal 
provisions for treatment in Oregon: b) implications of 
judicial and legislative developments and current theory for 
Oregon judges, legislatures and mental retardation specialists; 
and c) reconunendations. 
6 
CHAPTER I 
HISTORY AND CLASSIFICATION 
Throughout recorded history the condition of mental 
retardation has persisted. Society has labeled various 
characteristics from simply acting "differently" to I.Q. 
scores as evidencing mental retardation. Similarly, 
society's attitudes toward the mentally retarded have also 
varied from ostracism, condemnation and even death to paren-
tal affection. Laws and treatment have swung from extremes 
of institutionalization to deinstitutionalization for all 
retarded. Vestiges of archaic labels based upon religion 
or superstition ·. and remnants of legal precedent which have 
not been amended to conform with current theory and research 
findings impede the normalization and habilitation of the 
mentally retarded. This chapter examines the history of the 
methods in which society, the law, and psychology have dealt 
with mental retardation. 
The learned Greeks recognized that mental disabilities, 
which include both mental illness and mental retardation, 
were the result of scientifically explainable conditions 
7 
rather than evil spirits or demons, but even as recent as 
the eighteenth century it was thought demons possessed some 
. d 8 min s. Hippocrates, admittedly centuries ahead of his time, 
sought to classify mental infirmities and to provide clean, 
comfortable surroundings for persons afflicted with mental 
disabilities, 9 thus establishing the protective theory 
regarding the disabled. However Greek city states dealt 
very harshly with the mentally retarded sometimes throwing 
them off mountains and leaving them to die. 10 
The first written law dealing with the mentally dis-
abled was included in the Twelve Tables of Rome, 449 B.C., 
which provided: 
If a person is a fool, let his person and his goods 
be under the protection of his family, or his paren-
tal relatives, if he is not under the care of anyone.11 
A person was considered mentally disabled when he did not act 
like other people. The Code of Justinian, 528 A.D. provided 
that once a guardian was appointed for the mentally disabled 
person, the person was unable to enter into contracts, marry, 
Bcoleman,J.C., Abnormal Ps cholo 
Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman 
and Modern Life. 
Co. 4th Ed. 1972. 
9Asch,S.H., Mental Disability in Civil Practice, 
Rochester,N.Y.: Lawyer's Cooperative Publishing Co., 1973. 
lOGearheart,B.R. & Litton,F.w.; The Trainable Retarded. 
St. Louis: C.V. Mosby Co., 1975. 
11 Asch, supra. 
make a will or be guilty of any crime requiring criminal 
intent. 12 The guardian was in control except when the per-
son was lucid, at which time the person was permitted to 
8 
control his own affairs. When the period of lucidity passed, 
the guardian was in control once more. It is not clear how 
or by whom "lucidity" was defined. 
Early Western European cultures also had laws restrict-
ing the rights of the mentally disabled. The Visigothic 
Code of the early Germanic Tribes in 800 A.D. provided: 
All persons who from infancy, or indeed from any age 
whatever, are insane and remain so without intermission, 
cannot testify, or enter into a contract, and if they 
should do so, it will have no validity. But such as 
have lucid intervals, shall not be prohibited from 
business transactions during those periods.14 
During this historical period many mentally retarded were 
kept as fools or jesters for entertainment of the elite of 
Rome and the Germanic Tribes. Some were given special treat-
ment in the belief that they had some connection with God.15 
. 
13 Kanner,L., History of the Care and Study of the 
Mentally Retarded. Springfield, Illinois: Charles c. Thomas, 
1964. 
14Asch, supra. 
15Gearheart & Litton, supra. 
9 
Thirteenth Century English law contained prohibitions 
similar to those of the Germanic Tribes and developed two 
categories of the mentally disabled: 1) lunatic--a person 
who .. hat.h understanding but .•• hath lost the use of his person" 
as a result of a divine visitation and 2) idiot--a person who 
"hth d d" f h" · · 1116 a no un erstan ing rom is nativity. 
In early English common law, upon a petition being 
filed, a jury could find the person a lunatic or an idiot. 
In either case, the King was given control over the person 
and his property. However since "lunatics" had periods of 
lucidity the King had to account to the "lunatic'' for money 
received from his property during those times · when he was 
lucid. As a result of this difference the jury almost · 
always found the person to be a lunatic so that there was 
at least a chance that the King's control would not be com-
plete.17In England and elsewhere Protestants lead by Luther 
and Calvin abandoned the earlier theroy that the mentally 
retarded had some connection with God and declared them 
Godless. and possessed by demons.18 
16
statute de Praerogative Regis, as quoted in Asch, 
supra. 
17 Brackel,S.J. & Rock,R.S., The Mentally Disabled and 
the Law, (Revised ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
19 /I. 
18 h . Gear eart & Litton, supra. 
10 
The practice of labeling the mentally disabled was ex-
panded in Seventeenth Century England where the courts estab-
lished four categories of mentally disabled persons: l)idiot, 
or natural fool, 2) a person of good mind who by visitation 
of God lost it, 3) lunatics who. were sometimes lucid and 
sometimes non compos mentis (totally disabled), and 4) those 
few like the drunkard who deprived themselves by their own 
volition. 19 
Early English common law required that the mentally 
disabled could not be guilty of a crime requiring criminal 
intent because he could not form the necessary criminal in-
tent. In M'Naughten's case20 Daniel M'Naughten was found 
not guilty of the murder of Sir Robert Peel's secretary 
(M'Naughten wished to murder Sir Robert) because he was 
laboring under such a defective reason, from disease 
of the mind, as not to know the nature and quality of 
the act he was doing, or if he did kn~y it that he did 
not know what he was doing was wrong. 
When found not guilty by reason of insanity, the mentally 
disabled often incurred a longer period of confinement and 
greater stigma than when convicted and incarcerated in::.jail 
instead of a mental institution. 
19Beverely's Case, as discussed in Asch, supra. 
2010 Clark & Fin. 200, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843). 
21 Id. The current Oregon law on the so-called "insanity 
defense" is found in ORS 161.295 and is discussed in Chapter 
III. 
11 
In the United States laws in general were originally 
enacted to deal with property and contracts. Only later were 
society and · then · individual· :.rights included. And only very 
recently have minority rights been included. Laws regarding 
the disabled were originally to deal with the disabled's 
property and to protect society by institutionalizing the 
disabled. In 1667, for example, Massachusetts passed a 
statute giving town selectmen, similar to our city commis-
sioners, authority to take steps to insure that violently 
distrubed individuals did not "damnify others 11 • 22 In 
Pennsylvania in 1751 Benjamin Franklin successfully petition-
ed the Pennsylvania Assemply for the establishment of a hos-
pital which would accept mentally ill patients along with 
those suffering physical ailments. In Williamsburg, Virginia 
in 1773 the first hospital solely for the mentally ill was 
established, and the second one established in Lexington, 
Kentucky in 1824. 23 In 1788 New York enacted a statute per-
mitting constables to lock up the "furiously mad and danger-
ous" unless they . were in the control of friends or relatives. 
22 Asch, supra. 
[T]here are sometimes persons, who by lunacy, or 
otherwise are furiously madd [sic] or are so far 
disordered in their senses that t~ly may be danger-
ous to be permitted to go abroad. 
In 1848 the first institutions exclusively for the 
12 
education and care of the mentally retarded were established 
in Massachusetts. 25 Between 1850 and 1860 institutions for 
the mentally retarded were established in New York, Ohio, 
Connecticut, and Kentucky. 26 In 1890 there were 14 institu~ 
tions for the mentally retarded in the United States; by 1910 
there were 26 and by 19_23 the number had increased to 40. 27 
In the latter nineteenth century the mentally retarded were 
the "villains of society" and the "mother of crime, pauperism 
and degene~acy,• 28 and as a consequence more and more mentally 
retarded were removed from society and placed in institutions. 
Institutional growth paralleled society's fears of the men-
tally retarded. 
24chapt. 31, New York Laws of 1788. 
25Gearheari & Litton, supra. 
27Rothman,D., in Kindred,M., Cohen,J., Penrod,D. & 
Shaffer,T. (eds.) The Mentally Retarded Citizen and the 
Law. sponsored by the President's Committee on Mental 
Retardation, New York: The Free Press, 1976. 
28 h . Gear eart & Litton, supra. 
13 
The early twentieth century displaced the nineteenth 
century emphasis on institutions with an emphasis on special 
education--f irst in special schools and then in the public 
schools. New York, Cleveland, and Providence, Rhode Island 
were the first to establish special education classes for the 
mentally retarded within the - public schools. The number of 
mentally retarded in the public schools increased from 
8,000 in 1910 to 770,000 in 1975 although only about 50% of 
the retarded children are now given assistance in special 
classes. 29 
The 1950's and 1960's were eras of legislation and 
national support for the mentally retarded, including legis-
lation enacted to provide for special education for handi-
capped children. 30 Legislation and support were in part the 
result of efforts by President John F. Kennedy and the 
National Association for Retarded Citizens. The support for 
the mentally retarded in the 1950 1 s and l960's has also been 
ascribed to 1) thorough disgust with the Nazi practice of 
ex.termination of retarded persons, 2) .growing interest in 
29Id. In 1970 the U.S. Bureau of Education for the 
Handicapped estimated the number of retarded children as 
1,360,737 compared with 707,737 in special education classes. 
Bureau of Education for the Handicapped, Annual Reports FY 
1968 and FY 1969. Washington, D.C., 4. Approximately 25% 
had no special education. The remainder used a variety of 
methods. However, the trend is away from special education 
and toward mainstreaming, discussed in Chapter II. 
mental retardation by biological and social scientists, 3} 
renewed interest that little was being done for the handi-
31 
capped, and 4} a well organized parent movement. 
14 
The 1970's thus far have been an era of normalization 
and litigation. Normalization, a psychological principle 
discussed in Chapter II, had its beginnings in the 
Scandinavian countries3 2 and has been promoted by Wolfens-
berger in the United States and Canada. The principle dir-
ects society to provide services and facilities that permit 
the individaul to function in a manner that is as culturally 
normal as possible and implies: l} community level services 
for the mentally retarded, 2} educational and training pro-
grams integrated with "normal" individuals, 3} residential 
facilities in small units resembling homes, and 4} daily 
contact with normal adults and the opposite sex, and work 
alongside the non-retarded.33 
To implement normalization and secure other rights for 
the mentally retarded, the 1970's have witnessed a prolifer-
ation of litigation essentially concerned with the provision 
31Kott,M.G., The History of Mental Retardation, in 
Rothstein,J.H. (eds.}, Mental Retardation: Readings and 
Resources. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971; 
Saras on, s. B. & Doris, J. , Psycholog:ic·a:1 Problems.:'. in Mental 
Deficiency. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. 
32wolfensberger,W., Normalization: The Principle of 
Normalization in Human Services. Toronto: National Institute 
on Mental Retardation, 1972. 
33Gearheart & Litton, supra. 
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of appropriate education and/or training in the public 
schools, 2) adequate care, protection from harm, and approp-
riate training within institutional settings and 3) just and 
proper compensation for labor. 34 The decisions by the courts 
have held that 1) the mentally retarded and all other handi-
capped chil~ren have a right of free access to public educa-
tion, 2) inJ titutionalized mentally retarded have a right to 
receive treatment that will lead to habilitation rather than 
deterioration, 3) proceedings for commitment or other 
infringements upon the liberty of the mentally retarded be 
conducted fairly and if restrictions are imposed they be the 
l~ast restrictive alternative, and 4) the mentally retarded 
forced to labor against their will at least be given adequate 
compensation for all non-therapeutic work~ 35 
LEGAL TERMINOLOGY 
Varying terminology from law, medicine, and psychology 
has clouded communication among professionals--all concerned 
with mental retardation. 
The lawyer came first; it was he, and not the physician 
who had to manage the consequences of mental disease 
insofar as they affected the interests of the com-
munity. The lawyer was then the first to see to it 
that the psychotic disturber of the peace be taken 
out of. circulation, that the homj.cidal maniac (or 
cr;iminal i.nsane} be ;r:;-emoved !rom the community and 
isolated somewhere,: that p;roperty · mismanaged · and 
abandoned by a person mentally deranged be taken care 
of in some legitimate way. In other works, all the 
problems which .have preoccupied psychiatry ever since 
it was born existed to the full extent of their 
urgency before it was born, Attempts at their 
practical solutions were made, precedents established, 
traditions developed, without benefit of any scien-
' tific clinical psychopathology; the very possibility 
of the development of such ~~ychopathology could not 
be fathomed for many years, · 
The law categorizes a person under a specific terminology, 
16 
and determines his rights accordingly. This practice has 
been criticized, since much of the terminology is inapprop-
riate or anachronistic, but the categorization process is 
t . 11 · 1 · d . t 3 7 s 1 ut1 1ze in most s ates. 
The following are some of the terms and definitions 
used by the courts and definitive case references: 1) dotage--
feebleness of the faculties caused by old age; 38 2) feeble 
mindedness--incomplete development of the mind viewed from 
a socio-legal standpoint, not necessarily permanent; 39 
36zilboorg, Legal Aspects of Psychiatry, in Zilboorg & 
Itall (eds.) Oge Hundred Years of American Psychiatry. New 
York: Harco~rt Brace, 1944. 
37Kindred, Cohen, Penrod & Shaffer, supra. 
38Anders·on v. State, 54 Ariz. 387, 96 P.2d 281 (1939). 
39Re Masters, 216 Minn. 553, 13 N.W. 2d 487 (1944). 
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3) idiocy.-·-an absence of all mind or reason from birth; 40 
4} imbecility--menta,l weakness which may not amount to 
incompetency;41 5) lunacy--a mind directed by will but mis-
guided by judgment; 42 6) monomani.a--insane on a particular 
subject, sane on others;43 7) moral insanity--inability to 
distinguish from right or wrong; 44 8} . non· ·comp·os mentis--
total and positive incompetency·. 45 
Often different labels are used in different legal 
contexts. To determine the existence of a mental disability, 
Oregon, for example, uses: l} "mental illness" and "mental 
deficiency .. in discussing civil commitment; 2) "competency" 
in discussing appointment of a conservator or guardian, 
criminal responsibility and ability to stand trial, ability 
to enter into contracts, ability to execute a will and ability 
to obtain a driver's license or testify at a trial; and 3) 
"mentally handicapped" in discussing education and discrim-
ination in employment and housing. 
A difficulty arises from the use of the same label in 
40Jo:nes v. Commo:nwealth, 154 Ky. 152, 159 s.w. 568 (1915) 
41 .. 
. s1·au·ghter v. Heath,. 127 Ga. 474, 57 S.E. 69 (1911). 
4 2rn re Vanauken, 1 O N • J. Eq • 18 6 (18 5 4) • 
43
state v. John, 30 N.C. 330 (1905). 
44state v. Levelle, 34 s.c. 120, 13 S.E. 319 (1906). 
45 .. .. 
Greenwade v. Greenwade, 43 Md. 313 (1875). 
different legal contexts: 
The same term :may be used in different parts of codes 
or statute~, everi though ~ach of these parts may be 
designed to accomplish a different result and may be 
intended to apply to a different class of persons. 
For example, identical terms are often used to 
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describe persons subject to involuntary hospital-
ization, and those incapable of caring for themselves. 
In fact, the law of these areas applies to a different 
mental condition; hence, it is possible to be "me.ntally 
ill" for the purpose of involuntary hospitalization 
but to have a~ th7 same .time s~~ficient capacity to 
execute a valid .will or marry. 
In the case of civil commitment the person must be 
mentally deficient and in need of care, custody or training. 
"Mentally deficient" is not defined. Based upon the dual 
requirement of mental deficiency and a need for care, cus-
tody and treatment before commitment, it would seem that men-
tal deficiency is viewed by the law as embodying something 
other than a need for care, custody or training. Statutes 
relating to the appointment of a guardian or conservator de-
fine an "incapacitated person" as one "who is unable, without 
assistance to properly manage or take care of himself or his 
personal affairs. 1147 This may offer courts some statutory 
guidance in determining whether or not a person is mentally 
deficient, but the decision is ultimately a matter of judicial 
discretion based upon the testimony of psychologists and 
psychiatrists who have tested and examined the individual. 
46Brackel & Rock, supra. 
47oRS 126.003(4). 
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PUBLIC AND ~ PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS 
Both public and private organizations have had a 
tremendous impact upon the research, education, legislation 
and litigation concerning the mentally retarded. Through-
out the years a number of these groups have made significant 
contributions. The most influential groups are as follows: 
1) American Association on Mental Deficiency, founded 
in 1876 as a largely professional group, has been :engaged in 
research in the prevention of retardation,_ educational pro-
gramming, various residential service mod~ls and the estab-
lishment of standards and procedures for use with the men~ 
tally retarded. Their standards includ~.: a) Standards for 
State Residential Institutions, b) Manual on Terminology and 
Classification in Mental Retardation, and c) AAMD Adaptive 
Behavior Scale. It publishes the American 'Journal of Mental 
07,f~.c,i,,encx. (ind Mental Reta·raati·on _ bi-monthly. 
2) National Association for Retarded Citizens, founded 
in 1950, is highly involved in initiating classes and :prograrns 
for retarded children and youth and litigation. It is one of 
the sponsors of the National Center for Law and the Handicapped. 
NARC has also performed evaluations of certain_ govEJrnrnental 
services d~aling . with the mentally retarded. It has profes-
sional members r _but it is primarily a . group composed of i:arents 
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of the mentally retarded, 
3) United Cerebral J;>alsy Associations, Inc., founded in 
1949, is concerned with legislation and education for all 
handicapped. It has been instrumental in supporting federal 
legislation in this area: and has pursued research on causes 
of mental retardation, expending approximately one million 
dollars per year for research. 
4) President•s Committee on Mental Retardation, founded 
in 1966, was initially charged to evaluate all federal efforts 
in the area of mental retardation and devise new ways to com-
bat the problem. In its first year the committee outlined 
ten top priority areas: 
a) availability of mental retardation services to more 
of the nation's people; 
b) more effective and extensive manpower recruitment 
and training programs for work with the mentally retarded; 
c) fuller use of existing resources; 
d) more public-private partnerships in program devel-
opment, services, and research; 
e) development of a national mental retardation infor-
mation and resource center; 
f) continuing encouragement of basic research, train-
ing in application of research, and rapid translation of 
research results into service program uses; 
g) immediate, major attention to early identification 
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and treatment o! the mentally retarded; 
hl the special needs o~ the' mentally retarded taken 
into account by social and institutional planning for the 
coming decades; 
i) clarification of the legal status of the mentally 
retarded individual guaranties of rights; and 
j} imaginative ideas and approaches that will make new 
advances possible by everyone interested in helping the 
mentally retarded and combating retardation. 48 
The President's Committee has sponsored publication of 
articles and books explaining the importance of deinstitu-
tionalization and normalization, e.g. The Mentally Retarded 
Citizen and the Law and Cha'n·g:ing Patterns· i ·n· Resiae·ntial 
Services for the Menta"lly Retarded. It has had considerable 
impact on the federal legislation dealing with habilitation 
also. 
PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMINOLOGY 
Despite the efforts of the above groups, the law has 
yet to rid itself of many archaic and invalid legal defini-
tions for mental retardation. While there is in psychology 
no single universally accepted definition of mental retarda-
tion, there is general agreement that diagnosis of mental 
48G h . ear eart & Litton, supra. 
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retardation should be based upon at least three criteria: 
1) measured intelligence, 2} adaptive behavior level and 3) 
medical classification based on physical infirmities and 
d . b'·l't' 49 isa i i ies. The definition deve.loped by the American 
Association on Mental Deficiency is widely accepted: 
mental retardation refers to significantly . sub-
average general intellectual frinctioning existing 
concurr7ntly with ~eficits in adaptive beha~ior~ 
and manifested during the developmental period.~o 
Intellectual functioning is measured by an individual 
standardized test of intelligence and performance, and adap-
tive behavior by how well the person meets the standards of 
his age and cultural group. 51 The ranges of retardation 
based on these two standards have been labeled for 
49Roos,P.,Basic Facts About Mental Retardation, in 
Ennis, B. & Freidman (eds.) 1. Legal Rights o·f the Mentally 
Handicapped. New York: Practicing Law Institute, 17, 1973. 
50Manual on Terminology and Classi fication in Mental 
Retardation, 5 American Association on Mental Deficiency, 
Special Publication Service No. 2, Grossman,H.(ed.), 1973. 
The Dia nostic and Statistical Manual· for Mental Disorders. 
2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric Association, 
1968, defines mental retardatation as "subnormal general intel-
lectual functioning which originates during the developmental 
period and is associated with impairment of either learning 
and social adjustment or maturation or both." p. 14. 
51Gearheart & Litton, supra. Available scales include: 
AAMD Adaptive Behavior Scales, Alpern-Boll Developmental Pro-
file, Blathazar Scales of Adaptive Behavior, Bristol Social 
Adjustment Guides, Cain-Levine Social Conpetency Scale, Fair-
view Behavior Evaluation Battery, Gardner Behavior Chart, Hos-
pital Adjustment Scale, Newman-Doby Measure of Social Compet-
ence, Preschool Educational Attainment Record, Progress Assess-
ment Chart of Social Development, Social Competence Rating, 
and Vineland Social Maturity Scale, Robinson & Robinson, supra, 
359. 
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descx-;iptive conveni.erice as; ll mildly retarded, 2) moderately 
retarded, 3r severely retarded, and 4) profoundly retarded. 52 
Retardation is partially a social classification, non-
existent in a vacuum. It is a product of interaction between 
individual capabilities and social demands, resulting in what 
is termed ''deficits in adaptive behavior". One mentally 
retarded person could be reclassified if either his function-
ing improved or the social demands made upon him changed. 
Like mental illness, retardation is a label applied to a very 
diverse population. At least 250 causes of mental retardation 
have been identified, resulting in individuals with widely 
varying degrees of intellectual and adaptive functioning. 
52National Association for Retarded Children, Facts on 
Mental Retardation 5 (1971) • In order to place the categories 
in perspective the word descriptions- and corresponding I.Q. 
ranges are as follows: 
mild 
moderate 
severe 
profound 
Stanford-Binet Wechsler 
SD-16 SD-15 
52-67 
36-51 
20-35 
below 20 
55-69 
40-54 
25-39 
below 25 
I.Q. should not be the only diagnostic criterion. The person's 
developmental history, academic and vocational achievement, 
motor skill, and emotional and social maturity should also be 
considered in making evaluations of retardation. · 
In 1970 approximately 3% of the general United State's 
population was mentally retarded. Of this mentally retarded 
population 89% were classified as mildly retarded, 6% moderate, 
3 1/2% severe, and 1 1/2% as profound. National Association 
for Retarded Children, supra, p.15, n.l. 
24 
Mental retardation specialists have been called upon to 
testify in court on the definition _of mental retardation. 
An eXample .of such a ca·se :is· New York State Ass·ociation for 
Retarded Children: and Parisi v. Garey. 53 Parisi was a class 
action brought by residents: of the Willowbrook Development 
Center on Stanten Island, New York against state administra-
tors controlling the facili_ty and the Governor of New York. 
The c.ourt found that the residents had a right to treatment 
and after further testimony, .the parties agreed to certain 
minimal habilitation standards. Dr. James D. Clements, a 
member of the President's E:olnmittee on Mental Retardation and 
past president of the American Association on Mental Defic-
iency, observed that mental retardation is not a single 
behavior: 
Individuals with the same medical diagnosis and 
same level of measured adaptive behavior may still 
differ ·widely as to the pattern of their ability, 
the.signs and symptoms tha~ t~ey exhibit and the 54 variety of other characteristics they demonstrate . 
53No. 72 ... c-356?351 (E .. D". N.Y., April .30, 1975) as 
reported in The Mental Disab:ility Law Reporter, 1977, 1(4) 
229. 
54Id. 
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More than 27S~OOO people are institutionalized in the 
nation's publ·ic and private residential facilities for the 
mentally retarded, according to the President's Committee on 
Mental Retardation. This number represents less than 4% of 
all mentally retarded persons1 the remaining 96% reside in 
the community.SS As a result of efforts by many groups, such 
as the National Association for Retarded Citizens and the 
President's Committee on Mental Retardation, it is increas-
ingly accepted that very few of those classified as mentally 
.. , 
re.ded are severely retarded, the majority being mildly or 
mod~rately retarded.S6 The concept of custodial care, based 
on the presumption that mental retardation is an irrevocable 
status (often a self-fulfilling prophecy) , has changed to a 
developmental model: the mentally retarded are capable of 
growth and learning regardless of their level of retardation 
SS 
Fact Sheet on Mental Retardation, Multnomah Associ-
ation for Retarded Citizens, October, 1974. 
S6see note S2. 
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or age.57 
Generally the causes of mental retardation fall within 
nine categories following or associated with: 1) infection 
such as rubella during the first tremester of pregnancy, 
intoxication, carbon monoxide or lead poisoning, 2) trauma, 
3) metabolism disorder or poor nutrition, 4) a growth such 
as a cyst or tumor or gross postnatal brain disease, 5) 
diseases and conditions due to unknown prenatal influence, 
6) prematurity, 7) genetic abnormality, 8) major psychiatric 
disorder, 9) psycho-social deprivation and 10) unknown or 
uncertain causes.58 
The autistic child is sometimes included in the broad 
category of mentally retarded. Autism begins in infancy and 
is characterized by an inability to relate to others, specific 
57Roos,P., McCann,B. & Patterson,E.G., A Developmental 
Model of Mental Retardation, paper presented at 1970 Annual 
Convention of National Association for Retarded Children. 
"Children who are classified as mentally retarded, although 
limited in their potential for advanced academic achievement 
can usually be brought by special education to a state of 
self-sufficiency as adults. Moderately retarded ... can learn 
to take care of their personal needs and perform many useful 
tasks in the home or in a sheltered working situation. The 
severely retarded ... can learn self-care, and ..• in such areas 
as behavior control, self-protection, language development 
and physical mobility." National Association for Retarded 
Children, Facts on Mental Retardation, p.4, n.l, 1975. 
58Baumeister,A.A., Mental Retardation. Chicago:Aldine 
Publishing Co., 1967. The listing is based upon etiology 
classifications derived by the American Association of Men-
tally Disabled and The Di:agn:ostic and Statistical· Manual of 
Mental Disorders (2nd ed.), supra. 
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language problems, and a concern for maintaining sameness. 5 9 
In contrast to the oj;ten warm and affectionate retarded child, 
the autistic child displays aloofness and appears cold and 
detached. Behavior therapy has been used effectively with 
the autistic--the most widely known the project based at 
UCLA.60 Although many of the same procedures are used with 
the autistic as with the mentally retarded, autism refers to 
a fairly rare syndrome, not included in this paper. 
Research is continuing to assist in determining the 
causes of mental retardation. While prenatal care, genetic 
counseling, nutrition, and control of toxins such as lead 
offer hope for curtailing its pervasiveness, mental retarda-
tion will continue to exist. This paper will not review the 
literature on the etiology of retardation, 61 but rather is 
concerned with the habilitation or normalization of the men-
tally retarded and the legal provisions for treatment. 
59coleman, supra. 
60Lovaas, O.I. & Koegel,A.L., Behavior Therapy With 
Autistic Children, in Yearbook of the National Society for 
the Study of Education. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1973. 
61The interested reader should see Robinson,N.M. & 
Robinson,H.B., The Mentally Retarded Child: A Psychological 
Approach. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1976; Baumeister, 
supra; and Gearheart & Litton, supra for more discussion. 
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SUM.MARY 
Mental retardation has been recognized for centuries. 
Society's attitudes have shifted from ostracism and death to 
habilitation and training, seldom seeking association with 
the mentally retarded except for purposes of ridi.cule and 
entertainment. At various times in history, an obligation to 
the mentally retarded person has been recognized, but perhaps 
more strongly to the mentally retarded's family and friends. 
In any event, for at least 2500 years laws have been enacted 
affecting the rights of the mentally retarded. 
Especially in England and the United States, law is 
based on precedent. A statute or judicial ruling once estab-
lished is difficult to overcome and change. 62 Since laws 
dealing with the mentally retarded have been in existence 
for approximately 2400 years before formal psychology began, 
many of the restrictions imposed upon the mentally retarded 
are anachronistic, failing to take into consideration the 
potential of the mentally retarded for development and train-
ing. While the law has been aware of diversity of persons 
within the classifications of mental retardation by creating 
labels for groups perceived as having certain characteristics, 
- its labels are often antiquated and are not based on any 
62stare d~cis·i's· is the Latin te:i;m .used by courts to . 
indicate established ·judici~1 : ·preee.dent. In the case of 
judicial opinions unless some good cause is shown, a prior 
decision may be refined but it will be overruled. 
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recognized .tes.ts nor ident.if iable behavior . . 
. . 
Psychologists are tendi~g toward more ·narrow definitions 
and spec.ific classifications :due ·.to the heterogene:i,ty ·of those 
termed mentally retarded, and have devised tests. for ident-
ifying and classifying persons within the group. Much has 
been discovered about the kinds. of activities mentally 
retarded people can learn and methods for teaching them. 
Mental retardation specialists . generally agree on promotion 
of the least restrictive setting and as norinal a life as 
possible for the ·retarded. 
Increasingly the legal and psychology profe~sions are 
interacting in courtrooms, legislative and administrative 
hearings and in professional publications on the question of 
mental retardation and in particular the right of the mentally 
retarded person to "treatment" or "habilitation" as used by 
attorneys and judges and "normalization" as used by psycholo-
. gists. 
Litigation in the 1960' s . and 1970' s . has g.iven rise .to 
the right to treatment discussed in ChapterIV. Habilitation 
is the current legal standard in both judicial opinions and 
legislation and normalization the principle most used by 
psychologists, · In the tallowing chapter the normalization 
principle and other psychological concepts are examined. 
Chapter III then overviews pres·ent laws. as they affect the 
daily rights of the mentally retarded since many present laws 
seriously constrain efforts of habilitation. 
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CHAPTER II 
CURRENT CONCEPTS IN MENTAL RETARDATION 
Treatment of mental retardation is affected by attitudes 
of society, the law, and medical and psychological understand-
ing, theory and research. As outlined in Chapter !, . concepts 
of mental retardation and the ensuing treatment of the retarded 
by society, by the health professions, and under the law, have 
undergone dramatic changes. The fact that the group labeled 
retarded is not homogeneous adds to the confusion; definitions 
63 
are complex. Important issues before the law (definition 
and classification, right to education, right to treatment, 
right to monetary reward for services} are being considered, 
but it is a new and unsettled area of law. As will be dis-
cussed in Chapter I~ there are no significant court decisions 
63 h "f' 1 . f d . th' . T e speci ic popu ations re erre to in is paper, 
those involved in research summarized in this chapter, those 
referred to when discussing theories of normalization and a 
developmental model, and those considered in legal cases 
and legislation, include all those in the DSM II Classification 
of mental retardation. 
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on several important issues and conf li.cting decisions on 
others. The predominant concept of the mentally retarded 
under the law is as a child-.... to be protected and cared for, 
and secondarily to promote his individual growth and rights, 
as will be discussed in Chapter III. Courts and legislat~res 
increasingly seek answers to questions regarding treatment 
as well as definition and classification. 
In psychological literature there has been a reaction 
to the earlier enlargement of the definition of mental 
retardation. 64 The trend is to narrow the definition and to 
deal with the retarded as individuals with many different 
skills, abilities and needs for treatment. It is important 
to restrict generalizations from court cases as well as from 
studies to specific groups because the retarded are such a 
heterogeneous group. Laws broadly stated may be as harmful 
as studies too broadly generalized. 
This chapter examines the archaic models of mental 
retardation, some present conditions in treatment facilities, 
emerging ideologies, some specific treatment facilities or 
applications reflecting the current theories, recent research 
dealing with treatment, and methods of evaluating treatment. 
64Robinson & Robinson, supra. 
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ARCHAIC MODELS 
As seen in Chapter I, the law has generally espoused 
a protective attttude for the mentally retarded. In practice 
society has generally ostracized the mentally retarded except 
for amusement purposes. Treatment which has been provided has 
been based on the assumption that the mentally retarded are 
le-ss than human. The mentally retarded have been placed in 
five destructive , archaic models which have justified rejec-
tion and exclusion from the mainstream of society. 65 These 
archaic models assure that the mentally retarded will be 
isolated from community life and denied access to services 
. 1 f f . . h b" 66 essentia or unct1on1ng as a uman emng. 
These five destructive archaic models are: 1) the 
mentally retarded are subhuman organisms lacking the needs, 
aspirations and sensitivities of other human beings, and are 
therefore to be allowed minimal freedom with little or no 
regard for their human rights, 2) the mentally retarded are 
a menace to society because of their criminal tendencies and 
their propensity to procreate mentally retarded offspring with 
65
wolfensberger,W.,Normalization, supra. 
66 Roos,P., Basic Facts About Mental Retardation in 
Ennis & Friedman (eds.), supra. 
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similar tendencies thereby justifying their control in prison-
like institutions, 3) the mentally retarded are "suffering" 
and are therefore objects of pity to be kept contented and be 
protected from themselves and others, · 4} the mentally . 
retarded, with I.Q.'s and intellectual abilities comparable 
to children, are to be protected and kept "happy'' as some 
would treat the eternal child, 5) the mentally retarded are 
sick and therefore in need of hospitalization in clean, 
well organized institutions with adequate medical services. 
Since there is no known technique for regenerating brain 
tissue, their condition is hopeless and "custodial" care 
in hospital-like settings is the best that can be done. 67 
None of these five models recognize that the mentally 
retarded are not sub-human but are fully participating mem-
bers of the human race68 and are capable of learning and 
growth. 69 The mentally retarded are not a criminal menace, 
68united Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the 
Rights of Mentally Retarded Persons, Twenty-sixth session, 
A/RES/2856 (XXVI) 1972. 
69conley,R., The Economic·s of Mental Retardation. 
Baltimore: john Hopkins University Press, 1973; Levy,S., 
The Role of Mental Deficiency .in .the Causation of Human 
Behavior,· American Jo:urn:a:i of Men>t:'al Deficiency, 1954 , · ~, 455. 
34 
and they are only slightly more likely than the non-retarded 
to have retarded children. 70 overprotecti.on and dehumaniza-
tion by treating the mentally retarded as objects of pity, 
eternal children or hopelessly sick prevents their training 
and development,71 
These archaic models are destructive and may keep the 
mentally retarded in large institutions where they receive 
only custodial care or even if living in private institutions, 
or with family or friends their potential may not be realized. 
PRESENT CONDITIONS 
Present conditions in the institutions for the mentally 
retarded may be improving, but only slightly. Not only is 
the developmental model either not recognized or not imple-
mented, conditions are often deplorable. In 1948 the con-
ditions at the Philadelphia State Hospital for Mental Diseases 
were described: 
I entered buildings swarming with naked humans herded 
like cattle and treated with less concern, pervaded by 
a fetid odor so heavy, so nauseating, that the stench 
seemed to have almost a physical existence of its own. 
I saw hundreds of patients lying under leaking roofs, 
surrounded by moldly, decaying walls, and sprawling on 
rotting floors for want of seats or benches. 
70Kaplan,A.R., Genetics, in Wortis,J. (ed.) Mental Retar-
dation: An Annual Review, 57.-62. New York: Grune & Stratton, 
1972. 
71Roos, supra. 
••• Many of the attendants, I was told, were 
vagrants recruited directly from courts and police 
stations where they were reportedly given the choice 
of a jail sentence or going on the Byberry [the 
hospital] payroll.72 
In 1968 a study of several institutions revealed the 
following conditions: 
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In each of the dormitories for the severely retarded 
residents there there is what is euphemistically called 
a day room or recreational room. The odor in each of 
these rooms is over-powering. After a visit to a 
day room we had to send our clothes to the dry cleaners 
to have the stench removed. The facilities often con-
tribute to the horror. Floors are sometimes wooden 
and excretions are rubbed into the cracks, leaving 
permanent stench . 
.•• The question one might ask is, Is it possible 
to prevent these conditions? Although we are con-
vinced that to teach severely retarded to wear clothes 
one must invest time and patience, we believe it 
possible to do so--given adequate staff. There is one 
more requirement. The staff has to be convinced that 
residents can be taught to wear clothes, that thev>can be 
engaged in purposeful activities, that they can learn 
to control their bladders. The staff has to believe 
their "boys" and "girls" are human beings who can 
learn. Obviously, the money and the additional staff 
are vitally important. However, even more important, 
is the fundamental belief that each of these residents 
is a human being.73 
The report of the Joint Special Commission on Belchtown 
State School and Monson State Hospital in Massachusetts in 
March, 1971 found old, crowded, sparsely furnished buildings 
with inoperative fire alarm systems and doors. There were 
72 
. Deutsch,A. , The- Shame of the Sta"tes. New J~rs~y: 
Prentice-Hall,1948, 26. 
73Blatt,B. & Kaplan,F., Christmas in Purgatory--A 
Photographic Essay on Mental Retardation. Boston: Allyn & 
Bacon, 22, 1966~ 
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shortages of sanitation supplies and cockroach infestation. 
The residents had no privacy, received abusive punishment and 
unnecessary and incorrect medication. 74 It has been stated 
by those observing many institutions that one is entering the 
"land of the living dead" or ''stumbling into a dung hill, 
regardless of how it is camaflouged. 1175 
EMERGING PRINCIPLES 
Inappropriate myths are being replaced by new concepts or 
principles which, if implemented by law, hold promise of 
releasing institutionalized mentally retarded not only from 
squalid conditions in some institutions, but out of the 
institutions and of providing appropriate training and educ-
ation for the non-institutionalized. 76 One such principle is 
the developmental model which essentially provides that men-
tally retarded people be viewed developmentally as persons 
capable of growth and learning. Programs for ·retarded based on 
74 Rice v. Greenblatt, No. 72-469F (M.D. Mass., filed 
Feb. 7, 1972, complaint for plaintiff.) See also Offer, C.W., 
Field Report, Psychology Today, 1974, 61 for a general dis-
cussion of some current conditions. 
75Blatt & Kaplan, supra. 
76Roos, supra. 
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a developmental model have as their goals: 1) increasing the 
complexity of the individual's control; 2) increasing the 
individual's control over his total environment; and 3) 
optimizing each person's human qualities. 77 The developmental 
model rejects custodial care and cautions against the use of 
labels. 78 
A second concep:. is normalization. Wolfensberger, the 
ideology's chief spokesperson, has defined "normalization 11 
as 
utilization of means, which are as culturally nor-
mative as possible, in orda::- to establish and/or 
maintain personal behaviors and characteristics 
which are as culturally normative as possible. 79 
Under the normalization model deviation from the normative 
must be justified by demonstrating that the deviation is more 
f 1 th 1 . t' f t' 1 · d' 'd 1 80 success u an norma iza ion or a par icu ar in ivi ua . 
An important element of the model is that each person live in 
the least restrictive setting and that the least drastic 
alternative among equally effective potential programs or 
traatment options be utilized. 
77 Roos;P., McCann,B. & Patterson,E.G., A Developmental 
Model of Mental Retardation, paper presented at the 1970 
Annual Convention of NARC. 
78 Roos, supra 
79~.· Wolfensberger, Normalization, supra, 28. 
80Roos, P., Parent Organizations, in Wortis,J. {ed.) 
Mental Retardation, supra. 
[T]he normalization principle means making avail-
able to the mentally retarded patterns qnd conditions 
of everyday life which are as close as possible to the 
norms and patterns of the mainstream of society. 
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This principle should be applied to all the retarded, 
regardless whether mildly or profoundly retarded, or 
whether living in the homes of their parents or in 
group homes with other retarded. The principle is 
useful in every society, with all age groups, and 
adaptable to social changes and individual develop-
ments. Consequently, it should serve as a guide for 
medical, educational, psychological, social, and 
political work in this field and decisions and actions 
made according to the principle should turn out more 
often right than wrong.Bl 
A third concept, deinstitutionalization, is closely 
aligned with the element of least restrictive treatment and 
is similar to normalization albeit more limited in scope. 82 
The deinstitutionalization model views institutions as the 
most restrictive and least likely to yield desired results 
of all practiced treatment forms. Residential care and small 
group homes in the community are seen as desirable substitutes 
to the custodial care provided in institutions. Outside the 
institution there are also opportunities for social learning 
and behavioral techniques which have been successful in the 
81Kugel,B. & Wolfensberger,W. (eds.) Changing Patterns 
in Residential Services for the Mentally Retarded. Washington, 
D.C.: President's Committee on Mental Retardation, 1969, 181. 
82
wyatt v. Stickney, supra, 391, n.7. Testimony of 
Dr. Phillip Roos, Executive Director for National Association 
for Retarded Children. 
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growth and learning of the mentally retarded. 
A fourth concept is mainstreaming which has as its 
goal implementation of normalization in education by allowing 
retarded children to attend classes along with nonretarded 
84 
children for all or most of the school day. There are 
various plans but all involve specialized help to both pupils 
and teachers. The assumptions underlying the use of main-
streaming include 1) the special classroom is an isolating 
experience for retarded children, 2) retarded children are 
better able to achieve, both academically and socially when 
exposed to models whose achievement in both areas is more 
expert than their own; 3) the regular classroom bears a 
greater resemblance to the real world, and 4) exposure to 
handicapped children helps other children understand and 
. accept them. 85 
It has been suggested that in order for mainstreaming 
to work most effectively labeling must be avoided. 86 In 
addition care must be taken to assure that the retarded 
83
watson,L.S.,Jr., Behavior Modification of Residents 
and Personnel in Institutions for the Mentally Retarded in 
Baumeister,A.A. & Butterfield,E. (eds.} Residential Facilities 
for the Mentally Retarded. Chicago: Aldine, 1970. 
84 b' b" Ro inson & Ro inson, supra. 
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child be given equal educational opportunity. 87 Educational 
administrators may be reluctant to expend additional funds 
to provide proper opportunity for the retarded student when 
he is in a classroom with nonretarded children. It is in 
the state's interest financially, however, to furnish.an 
appropriate education for the handicapped child. It is also 
its moral obligation to maximize each individual's potential 
for happiness and human dignity. This latter approach 
focuses on the true meaning of education: helping the child 
adjust to his environment as well as he can. 88 
87 
"[Many judicial decisions ••• still define equality on 
a 'sameness'doctrine, equal resources to 'children whose 
needs are unequal.' Such a philosophy may have been approp-
riate for a society that was based on family economic pro-
duction that could absorb those who could not compete equally 
in the nation's economic system. Today, however, the 
education of a child is a community concern, for if he is not 
given skills sufficient for economic participation, then he 
will become dependent upon the community." Weibtraub & 
Abeson, Appropriate Education for all Handicapped Children: 
A Growing Issue, Syracuse Law Review, 1972, 23, 1037, 1055. 
88 h a· · 1d · · Comment: T e Han icapped Chi Has a Right to an 
Appropriate Education, Nebraska Law Review, 1976, 55, 637. 
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l\Pl?LICATIONS 
There is general agreement among psychologists that 
the principle of normalization, which in essence embodies 
most aspects of the models delineated above, offers the 
greatest opportunity for the mentally retarded person to 
achieve his or her optimum development. It is therefore 
helpful to examine how this principle has been implemented 
in the actual care of the mentally retarded. An examination 
of the care and treatment of the mentally retarded in Sweden, 
Nebraska and Oregon are illustrative of the principle in 
actual practice. 
Sweden has generally adopted the principle of normaliza~ 
tion for its delivery of services for the mentally retarded, 89 
and uses mainstreaming and deinstitutionalization to achieve 
normalization. Under its system retarded children are inte-
grated into nonretarded classrooms, the overall class size 
is reduced, and a teacher's aid is added to permit individual 
instruction while placing the retarded child in a more normal 
setting than he would experience in a special class. A few 
students live in boarding school with parents receiving 
instruction in how to care for the mentally retarded child at 
home and governmental allowances for expenses incurred. 
89Grunwald,K., Sweden, in Kugel & Shearer, supra. 
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Moderately and mildly retarded adults generally live in 
group horn.es with arp:roximateli six to eight other mentally 
retarded adults. The homes are in a. community setting with 
the staff, which is available for continuous advice on 
leisure activities and inter-personal relationships, living 
elsewhere. 
Severely retarded children and those who cannot live 
with their own families live in residential homes with a 
family. Parents maintain frequent contacts with their child-
ren and may take the children home for weekends or holidays. 
Residential homes, averaging approximately seven mentally 
retarded per home are located in the communities. While 
residential homes are more structured than group homes, 
residents there generally have their own rooms and take part 
in daytime activities of an industrial or occupational-
therapeutic nature in the community. 
For severely retarded adults with antisocial behaviors 
there are special hospitals with an average of 240 beds. Only 
a small percentage of the mentally retarded reside in the 
hospital and usually for only short term care. The numbers 
of mentally retarded in these hospital facilities are being 
reduced annually. The mentally retarded who begin in these 
institutions are progressively moved to residential homes 
and then to group homes as they are able to do so. 
The plan in Sweden is for integration of the mentally 
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l;'etarded into the community and development of his or her 
independence, :tt is organized on the princ;iple ot the small 
group being the most effective way ;for the mentally retarded 
to achieve normalization. Those placed in larger institutions 
are placed there for a short term with the goal of reducing 
restrictions as progress is made, Progress is followed by 
governmental ministries, unassociated with any institutions, 
through filed records and reports and visits with the mentally 
retarded themselves to insure conformity with the general 
principle of normalization. 90 
In Nebraska a system has been developed to supplement 
the existing state programs with deinstitutionalization as 
its goai. 91 The system's primary purpose is to provide a 
continuum of services to meet the needs of all retarded cit-
izens in Nebraska. The services include: 
1) Developmental and educational services. Mentally 
retarded who because of age or severity of mental retardation 
are unable to participate in mainstream public educational 
programs may be enrolled in developmental center programs to 
91 . k b k . 1 h Lensin ,B., Encor, Ne ras a, in Kuge & Searer, supra. 
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obtain training in daily living, language, and group inter-
action according to individual needs. Included in these 
services are the developmental maximation unit, designed to 
provide care for the more severely retarded's medical needs 
and to provide certain basic skills in intensive training 
sessions, and the behavior shaping unit, which seeks to pro-
vide intensive developmental services based upon the prin-
ciples of applied behavior analysis. 
2) Vocational Service Centers. These centers are designed 
to provide a wide range of evaluation and training services 
in the community. The mentally retarded are given an evalu-
ation of their employment capability and training to foster 
maximum development and growth. Groups of mentally retarded 
persons who have been evaluated may be employed in community 
business and industry under a subcontract with the business 
or industry. The retarded worker is thus able to work under 
the supervision of a mental health professional and to work 
with and model after non-retarded workers in a normal work 
setting. The goal of the program, independent community 
employment, is completed by job development and assistance 
in obtaining employment. 
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3) Residential Services. Families are encouraged to 
have their mentally retarded child remain at home. When this 
is not possible a child may be placed in a long term setting 
with a family. Some children between the ages of three and 
15 may live with up to five other retarded children in a 
duplex or apartment in an established neighborhood with 
surrogate parents. The children assist in performing routine 
household tasks similar to actual family settings, such as 
house cleaning and laundry. Some children who are more 
severly retarded and thus unable to function in a family-
type setting may be placed in a developmental maximation or 
behavior shaping unit described in (1) above. The most 
structured residence for children has special programs 
available. Placement of these children may have been initi-
ated by the courts, but the long term placement goal is in 
less restrictive and more normalized settings as soon as 
possible. 
Adults may live in an adult training residence where 
they may develop close relationships with a small group of 
friends or in an adult family living home in which the 
mentally retarded lives with up to two other mentally retarded 
adults and a non-retarded family. In both of these the adult 
is integrated into the community as normally as possible 
46 
Oregon offers a variety of services to the mentally 
retarded althou9h the emphasis is on education. The normal-
ization principle is espoused, but more work is required to 
93 
achieve this goal. A brief review of the types of services 
provided include: 
1) Preschool programs. These are individual programs 
focusing on physical, intellectual, emotional, and social 
development at an early age. Many programs include parent 
training, infant stimulation in the home and preparation for 
94 
transition into public school. 
2) Trainable mentally retarded classrooms. For children 
who are too retarded to be classified as educable mentally 
retarded, programs are provided which emphasize development 
in communication, social, motor-physical, quantitative, prac-
tical, and community living skills. Parents are trained to 
teach certain skills to their children in the home so that 
the education process is not limited to the school setting. 
3) Student progress records. These standardized tests 
are given to mentally retarded in educational programs twice 
93Gearheart & Litton, supra, 219, 
94Directory of Programs and Services: Developmental 
Disabilities. Portland, Oregon: United Cerebral Palsy, Inc., 
1977. 
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a year to provide a standardized means for collecting student 
performance data and to provide a tool for evaluating the 
programs offered. Nineteen skill areas are tested. 
4) Work activity centers. These nonresidential centers 
are available for the mentally retarded who are unable to 
participate in a sheltered workshop. Productivity is of less 
importance than the therapeutic aspects of the work.95 
5) Sheltered workshop programs. These generally 
private programs provide the mentally retarded and other dis-
abled persons with opportunities for improving job perform-
ance and increasing work productivity while manufacturing and 
marketing a product for consumer use.9 6 
6) Group homes. These facilities are located in the 
community and vary in size. They offer a variety of programs 
including education, crafts, recreation, occupational train-
ing, speech therapy and activity centers. 97 
95 
Gearheart & Litton, supra. Portland Habilitation 
Center, in addition to specific job training in food handling, 
custodial, and warehousing also provides work adjustment train-
ing, personal adjustment and an activity center. Directory of 
Programs, supra. 
96 
Goodwill Industries is an example of such a sheltered 
workshop program in which the mentally and physically disabled 
repair donated household itmes for resale at its own outlets. 
97 
On June 22, 1977, the appldtation of St.Vincent de 
Paul Rehabilitation Service of Oregon, !nc., was granted an 
application to construct the B.P. John Development Center for 
the mentally retarded. The 19 bed facility is to provide 
diagnostic, psychological, psychiatric, therapeutic, vocation-
al and avocational services for the mentally retarded. 
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8) Institutions. Oregon has two large residential 
institutions for the mentally retarded.--The Eastern Oregon 
Hospital and Training Center in Pendelton and the Fairview 
Training Center in Salem. 98 The two state operated institu-
tions house mentally retarded who were either involuntarily 
committed or voluntary admitted to a state mental health 
facility. 99 The institutions are generally restricted in the 
h b ·1· . . 'd d lOO a i itation services provi e • 
98 
The actual physical facilities of the Fairview Train-
ing Center, formerly the Fairview Hospital and Training , 
Center,have been viewed by millions of Americans, since many 
of the scenes for the film, One Flew over the Cuckoo's Nest 
were shot on location there. 
99 
Voluntary admission and involuntary commitment are 
discussed in Chapter III. 
100 
Tu per v. Fairview Hospital and Trainin Center, 
276 Or. 657, P.2d 1976) gives some indication that 
many of the restrictIOils are being reduced and there is at 
least some effort in providing treatment. (Tupper who was 
employed at the institution as a psychiatric aide had as 
one of his duties the supervision and training of "residents" 
living in one of several small, dormitory-like "cottages." 
His responsibilities included maintaining a "program book" 
in which the progress made by his residents in various 
training programs was recorded. When he either lost or 
failed to keep the book, he was discharged. Tupper appealed 
his discharge, which was affirmed by the courts.) 
49 
RESEARCH 
Research purposes, po:;:ocedures, and design on mental 
retardation have been as varied as the large, heterogeneous 
population itself. The rather recent, but rapidly increasing 
research has been basic and applied, with conclusions drawn 
from studies with the mentally retarded population and from 
generalized learning principles from studies with normal pop-
ulations. Studies have been done with mildly retarded "slow'' 
learners to the profoundly retarded and in classrooms, wards, 
group homes and work settings. There are at least three 
broad areas of research involved with retardation: 1) etiology, 
diagnosis and classification, and prevention~ 2) basic labor-
atory research on learning and memory processes; and 3) learn-
ing and other principles applied in vocational, educational, 
and treatment facility settings. It is the research concerned 
with treatment facilities and plans in the third area that is 
of primary interest when considering the right to treatment, 
but conclusions from the other areas and their implications 
for treatment/habilitation plans are mentioned first. 
Etiology 
The first area is a medical approach, dealing with 
etiology, diagnosis and classification, and prevention. 
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A majo;rity of federal funding ;fo;r research in mental retar-
da,tion and a p:t"ima,ry th;rust Qf the P;resident~s Committee 
on Mental Retardation is on discovering etiology and methods 
of prevention. Factors involved in etiology include brain 
damage, genetics, physical environment, psychological, and 
psychosocial disadvantage. The genetic versus environ-
mentalist debate is partially responsible for the thrust of 
research and interest in etiology, The 1959 AAMD Diag-
nostic Manual attached importance to the role of genetic 
factors while the 1973 version reflects a very environmen-
talistic position. The fact remains that in most cases a 
cause is unidentified. Treatment or habilitation plans 
might be better made when causes are known but such plans 
cannot await a full understanding of etiology, nor do they 
need to in order to be effective. 
Lab Research 
The second area of research deals with learning and 
memory. As basic lab research, this is one of the most 
active areas in psychology in general and in the field of 
mental retardation in particular since, by definition, a 
fundamental difference in the retarded is a slower, more 
inefficient way of acquiring knowledge,and skills. Between 
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1954 and 1974 over 1500 studies of learning processes were 
conducted with retarded individuals. 101 Vocational train,.. 
ing, academic education, and learning self help and basic 
living skills are essential in any habilitation program. 
Robinson and Robinson conclude from a review of research 
on learning and memory processes in the retarded that a 
major problem for the retarded is the inability to employ 
strategies. They also conclude that training in most aspects 
of learning is effective, but generalization of effects is 
102 - . 103 
very limited. Weisberg reviewed operant procedures 
in lab research with the retarded and, while suggesting 
that generalizations to nonlaboratory settings are especially 
difficult with retarded, concludes that all retarded seem 
cabable of some degree of learning. 
Berkson and Landesman-Dwyer, 104 in a review of behav-
ioral research on severe and profound mental retardation, 
(1955-74) document a large scientific literature on the 
lOlR b' o inson & Robinson, supra, 
102Id. 
103
weisberg,l?., Operant Prodedures With the Retardate: 
An Overview of Laboratory :Research, in Ellis,N.R. (ed.) 
International Review of Research in Mental Retardation, Vol. 
5. New York: Academic Press, 1971, 113-145. 
l04Berkson,G. & Landesman-Dwyer,s., Behavior Research 
on Severe and Profound Mental Retardation (1955-1974), 
American Journal of Mental Retardation Deficiency, 1977, 
81, 428. 
behavioral potential of severely and profoundly retarded 
persons. 1\s a result of the t~end towa.rd emphasis on an 
experimental orientation from the previous emphasis on 
diagnosis and classification, it has been repeatedly shown 
that the severely-profoundly retarded no longer should be 
considered hopeless and untrainable. 105 This body of 
research validates the right to treatment movement in that 
52 
it suggests that all retarded can benefit from treatment and 
therefore are entitled to treatment/habilitation and not to 
be placed on back wards in a custodial manner. 
Vocational and Educational Settings 
The third area deals with research in vocational, 
educational and treatment facility settings. Gold has re-
viewed research on vocational habilitation prior to 1973. 106 
He states that vocational training of the mentally retarded, 
which presently utilizes resources of the three primary 
disciplines--rehabilitation, psychology and education, should 
also use industrial management and industrial engineering 
as sources for training the mentally retarded. Schools and 
l0 6Gold,M.W., Research on the Vocational Habilitation 
of the Retarded; The Present, The Future, in Ellis,N.R. (ed.) 
International Review of Research in Mental Retardation. Vol. 
6. New York: Academic Press, 1973, 97. 
53 
workshops are the major sources ;for training the retarded. 
The sheltered workshop movement has resulted in 
the establishment o;f three main types of workshops 
for the retarded: the transitional shop, where clients 
coming from school programs, homes, or institutions 
prepare for placement into competitive employment; 
the extended care or terminal shop, where clients 
believed to be incapable of achieving competitive 
employment work for indefinite periods; and the 
comprehensive shop which attempts to service both 
types of clients.107 
The current trend is toward a program of habilitation 
combining academic instruction, vocational classes, and 
on-the-job training. Programs individually designed, as 
called for in the Wyatt decision, are most successful. 
The programs state that on-the-job expectations and amounts 
of responsibility and freedom are gradually increased~ how-
ever, Gold notes two discrepancies between plan and implemen-
tation. First, although opportunities exist, "training ••. 
almost without exception refers to exposure ~~ther than treat-
ment, or it refers to placing clients on a job station where 
it is hoped training occurs. 11108 Crossmanl09 in an article 
107 
Id. 
108 
Gold,~§upra, 100. 
109 
Crossman,J.E., A Technique for Programming Sheltered 
Workshop Environments for Training Severely Retarded Workers. 
American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1969, 73, 814-818. 
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on severely retaJ:;'ded workers, noted that the usual pattern 
is to rind work that retardates can do instead of training. 
Gold's :review, primarily descriptions of facilities 
and programs, notes poor incentives for the mentally retard-
ed as a further discrepancy between plan and implementation. 
In most facilities the most obvious incentive, money, was 
usually given noncontingently in very small amounts. There 
was little opportunity for the acquisition of skills in money 
management since everything was free. The pay scale for 
workers in institutions and sheltered workshops has recently 
undergone a tremendous change.110 The situation would be 
excellent for testing the effects of token and monetary 
rewards for work, except for at least two disadvantages for 
research--limited staff and dependence of workshops on 
contracts. But Gold reports that monetary and token 
110 
Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, supra. (Institutons 
residents who were not paid for work they were required to 
perform could obtain any withheld pay and other related 
damages in the courts if they could also show the work was 
nontherapeutic.) 
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systems and goal setting by the workers and the presence 
of a model worker112 and video-taped playback of on-the-job 
performance113 did increase productivity. 
Birnbrauer in a more recent review also acknowledges 
problems in research but has seven general conclusions re-
garding research on vocational habilitation and the 
114 
retarded: 
1) Combined µse of modeling and reinforcement principles 
has been shown to be more effective than less systematic 
approaches in increasing skills. The results were most 
impressive when the behavior measured was attention to work. 
111Huddle,D.D., Work Performance of Trainable Adults 
as Influenced by Competition, Cooperation, and Monetary 
Reward. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1967, 72, 198~ 
Hunt,J.G. & Zimmerman,J., Stimulating Productivity in-a 
Stimulated Sheltered Workshop Setting. American Journal of 
Mental Deficiency, 1969, 74, 43; Logan,D.L., Kinsinger,J.; 
Shelton,G. & Brown,J .M., iJihe Use of Multiple Reinforcers in 
a Rehabilitation Setting. Mental Retardation, June, 1971, 9, 
3. -
112Kliebhan,J., Effects of Goal-setting and Modeling 
on Job Performance of Mentally Retarded Adolescent. American 
Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1967, 73, 220. 
113ne Roo,W,M. & Haralson,H.L., Increasing Workshop 
Production Through Self-Visualization on Videotape. Mental 
Retardation, August 1971, 2_, 22. 
114Birnbrauer,J.S., Mental Retardation, in Leitenberg, 
H. (ed.) Handbook of Behavior Modification and Behavior 
Therapy, New Jersey: l?rentice-.Hall, 1976, 361-404. 
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He recommends analvzinq the components of strategies, hypo-
thesis testing, problem solving,. and abstracting relevant 
information and developing programs to teach these problem-
sol ving skills as well as specific tasks. 
2) Combinations of instructions, demonstrations, 
physical guidance, and reinforcement have effected changes 
in a variety of responses with many retardates in many 
contexts. 
3) Several studies support that response-reinforcer 
contingency is an essential aspect of some improvements in 
behavior. 
4) Studies have effected changes in rates of behavior 
that existed prior to intervention; intervention programs 
increased an infrequently occurring response or brought 
certain behaviors under stimulus, situational, or agent 
control. 
5) Retardates are very sensitive to reinforcement 
contingencies; that is, they acquire discriminations rapidly. 
6) Punishment effects dramatic decreases in behavior 
temporarily. Birnbrauer states that 
although I can think of no alternative but to apply 
severe punishment is some cases, I have seen nothing 
that has led me to change my opinion that suppression 
is a~ be~t5only the beginning of a program of habil-i tation. 
115Birnbrauer ,J. s., Generalization of Punishment .· 
Effects--A Case Study. Journal of Applied Behavio·r Analysis, 
1968, _!_, 201. 
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7) Variables controlling such repetitive acts as self-
injurious behavi.or remain a puzzle. 
In research specific .to the classroom with the mentally 
retarded dramatic changes in classroom behavior is effected 
by manipulation of response consequences. There are two 
problems: 1) maintenance of gains, and 2) although class 
behavior has been affected in impressive ways, academic learn-
ing has not been. 116 Modeling, social reinforcement and 
tokens have been found effective in teaching social problem 
solving, 117 motor skills, 118 game skills and number concepts,119 
116 
Roas,S.A. Effects of Intentional Training in Social 
Behavior on Retarded Children. American Journal of Mental 
Deficiency, 1969(a), 73, 912. 
117 
Id. 
118 
Ross, S.A. Effects of an Intensive Motor Skills 
Training Program on Young Educable Mentally Retarded Children. 
American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1969(b), 73, 920. 
119 
Ross, D.M. Incidental Learning of Number Concepts in 
Small Group Games. American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 
1970, 2_!, 718. 
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listening skills, 120 and problem solv~ng and planning. 121 
In an interesting study by Graubard, Rosenberg and 
Miller122 the purpose was to teach the retarded children in 
special classes to modify the behavior of peers and teachers. 
Students were taught to reinforce positive teacher response 
by establishing eye contact, nodding, and giving thanks for 
help, for example. The studentst behavior in class was 
changed for the better through this procedure. 
Individual programs and special methods have shown that 
even severely retarded can learn. 123 A review of the studies 
of special educational intervention for the educable and 
120Ross,D.M. & Ross,S.A., The Efficacy of Listening 
Training for Educable Mentally Retarded Children. American 
Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1972, 77, 137. 
121Ross,D.M. & Ross,S.A. Cognitive Training for the EMR 
Child: Situational Problem Solving and Planning. American 
Journal of Mental Deficiency, 1973, 78, 20. 
122Graubard, P.S., Rosenberg,H. & Miller,M.B., Student 
Applications of Behavior Modification to Teachers and 
Environments of Ecological Approaches to Social Deviancy, 
in Ramp, E.A. & Hopkins,B.s. (eds.), A New Direction for 
Education: Behavior Analysis. Vol. l.· Lawrence, Kansas: The 
University of Kansas Support and Development Center for Follow 
Through, 1971, 80-101. 
123 
Fuller,R, Breaking Down the IQ Walls: Severely 
Reta.rded People Can Learn to Read, Psychology Today, Oct. 197 4, 
97-100. 
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trainable retarded states that results are inconclusive.124 
Research is needed on the ~uestion of special classes versus 
integrated classes for the retarded since mainstreaming is 
the concept currently being put into practice. Robinson and 
Robinson review one of the few studies using random assign ... 
ment125 which found that all retarded children in the special 
classes appeared to be 
somewhat better off in emotional adjustment and peer 
acceptance ••• and the group with IQs above 75 did 
better in regular classrooms, whereas the EMR group 126 
with lower IQs made more progress in special classes. 
In a study by Budoff and Gottlieb127 academic, personal 
and social growth were compared for a special class of 
124 . 
Kaufman & Alberto, Research on Efficacy of Special 
Education for the Mentally Retarded, in Ellis,N.R. (ed.) 
International Review of Research in Mental Retardation, Vol. 
8, 1976, supra. 
125Goldstein,H., Moss,J.W. & Jordan,L.J. The Efficacy 
of Special Class Training on the Development of Mentally 
Retarded Children. Urbana; University of Illinois, Institute 
for Research on Exceptional Children, 1965. 
126Id. 
127Budoff ,M, & Gottlieb,J. Special Class EMR Children 
Mainstreamed: A Study of An Aptitude (Learning Potential) X 
Treatment Interaction, American Journal of Mental Deficiency, 
1976, g, 1. 
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educable mentally retarded. One _half remained in special 
classes and one half were placed in regular classes. After 
one year the integrated students were more controlled and had 
more positive feelings about school and themselves, indicat-
ing that the more able educable mentally retarded benefitted 
from integration in regular classes. 
Treatment Facilities 
Most research concerning treatment facilities has been 
done within one particular type of facility. A purpose with-
in wards is to explore the potential of behavior modification 
in training self-help and social skills for the severely and 
profoundly retarded, and in non-residential settings to ex-
plore the behavioral training procedures and other types of 
therapy with the educable mentally retarded. Little has been 
done to compare types of treatment facilities with each other, 
for instance the effects of group home living versus institu-
tion. 
There is a large number of studies of punishment such 
as seclusion, restraint, removal from the dining room, elec-
tric shock and overcorrection. The use of punishment is a 
major difference between the studies in wards and in other 
settings. This may be because the behaviors chosen to modify 
were those most aversive to the limited staff in wards--eat-
ing habits and toilet needs. Education, training, positive 
rein£orcement and modeling all require considerable staff with 
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special skills. Time Out has also been found effective with 
128 
the severely and profoundly retarded. The effectiveness 
of procedures such as Time Out, over-correction, reinforce-
ment and modeling need to be carefully studied considering 
the recent constraints on the use of shock and other aversive 
"therapy" or limits on primary needs (food). 
McCarver129 reviews the literature dealing with place-
ment of the retarded in the community after institutionaliza-
tion. He states that the literature is inconclusive, dis-
crepant and contradictory, mainly unable to reliably predict 
who will or will not succeed on community placement because 
most studies were post hoc surveys. Those institutionalized 
for the least amount of time were more successful in all areas 
of community adjustment (residential stability, employment, 
money management, sexual adjustment and social behaviors) ; 
however, length of stay was not a variable manipulated by 
the experimenters. The current development of alternatives 
128Birnbrauer, supra. "Time Out" has been defined as 
"contingent removal of the opportunity to earn positive re-
inforcement" and "contingent social isolation". Craighead, 
W.E., Kazkin,A.E., Mahoney,M.J., Behavior Modification, 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976, 237. 
129McCarver,R.B. & Craing,E.M. Placement of the 
Retarded in the Community: Prognosis and Outcome, in Ellis, 
N. (ed.) International Review of Research in Mental Retar-
dation, Vol. 7, supra, 1974. 
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to residential facilities underscores a need for research of 
these ;t;acilities and comparisons of facilities. Since the 
major trend is for placement into small community group 
homes as opposed to institutiona,l care, the efficacy of group 
homes needs further evaluation. Moen, Bogen and Aanes130 
found a low failure rate (as measured by recidivism) for 
residents placed in group homes from institutions; fewer 
than 15% of these placed in group homes needed return or 
readmission to institutional care. In a subsequent study, 
Aanes and Moen131 attempt to make a more objective assess-
ment of group homes increasing the level of functioning by 
using the Adaptive Behavior Scale in a pre- and post-test 
evaluation design, the tests being given in the group home 
before training and again one year later. Statistical 
comparisons were made for ten domains and 23 subdomains 
of the ABS and on three of the domains and eight of the sub-
domain areas there were significantly higher levels of func-
tioning. 
130Moen,M., Bogen,n. & Aanes,D. Follow ... up of Mentally 
Retarded Adults Successfully and Unsucce~sfully Placed In 
Community. Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 1975, 26(11), 
752. .... 
131 ' i . f Aanes,D. & Moen,M. Adapt ve Behavior Changes o 
Group Home Residents. Mental Retardation, 1976 (Aug} 14(4), 
36. 
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EVALUATION 
·Measuring the success of treatment has traditionally 
been assumed by the mental health profession, The question 
of treatment itself was examined in Eysenck's 1965 study of 
the effects of psychotherapy on the treatment of the mentally 
ill. He concluded: 
[p]sychoanalysis is no more successful than any other 
method, and that in fact all methods of psychotherapy 
fail to improve on the recovery rate obtained through32 ordinary life experience and non-specific treatment. 1 
As will be discussed in Chapter IV, courts have now 
held that the mentally retarded have a right to adequate 
treatment. Courts and commentators frequently use the terms 
"adequate", ,.permissible", "appropriate", and "responsible'' 
to describe the r~quired treatment. 133 These terms are im-
precise and courts are still faced with the applicable stan-
dard to be used. Courts have held that "adequate treatment" 
means each patient be given a "realistic opportunity to be 
132Eysenck, The Effects of Psychotherapy, International 
Journal of Psychiatry, 1965, 1, 99. Therapies based upon 
learning theories were excluded from the study, but Eysenck 
suggested they might be effective. 
133 
Schwitzgegel,.R.K. The Right to Effective Mental 
Treatment, California Law Review, 197 4, '62, 936. 
64: 
cured or improved", 134 "show therapeutic progress'', 135 
or be treated under the" least restrictive alternative'! 136 
To determine whether or not the treatment provided 
at a particular institution or by a particular agency is 
adequate the courts must set standards and evaluate the 
treatment actually provided. 
The right to treatment, if it is to become more than 
idealistic rhetoric devoid of practical social con-
sequences, must be measured by clear standards. The 
courts, legislatures, treatment personnel, and 
attornej_l!S must have some precise standard in mind 
by which they can determine whether the amount of 
treatment provided or not provided for a p~3~ent 
is an appropriate matter for legal action. 
Thus evaluation of treatment is now a responsibility of the 
courts as well as mental health professionals. Courts in 
making their evaluations, however, rely upon the testimony of 
psychologists to learn the nature of mental retardation, 
kinds of treatment suitable for particular mentally retarded 
persons, and standard treatment methods. It has been sug-
gested that a reasonable standard of treatment is 
134 
Wyatt v. Stickney, supra. 
135 
Jackson v. Indiana 406 u.s. 373 (1972). 
136 
Welsh v. Likens, 373 F.Supp, 487, 501 (D.Minn. 1974). 
137 
Schwitzgebel,R~K.,Right To Treatment for the Mentally 
Disabled: TheNeed for Realistic Standards, Harvard Civil 
Rights'--Civil Liberties Law Review, 197 3, .!!_, 513, 515. 
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ff . 138 e ectrveness. 
To evaluate the effectiveness of treatment courts use 
one or more of the following criteria: 1) structure of the 
institution, 2) process of treatment delivery and 3) treat-
ment outcome.139 A structural analysis, which is the most 
commonly suggested approach and probably the easiest to 
use, includes such things as the size of the institution, 
staff-patient ratios and per capita costs.140 For example, 
in Martalla v. Kelley141 the court examined the ratio of 
138 
Id. 
139 
Schwitzgebel.R., California Law Review, supra. 
140 
Schwitzgebel.R., Harvard Civil Rights--Civil Liberties 
Law Review, supra.Birnbaum in The Right to Treatment, American 
Bar Association Journal, 1960, 46, 499 suggested that courts 
adopt the American Psychiatric Association Standards for 
Hospital and Clinics which required: one physician for every 
40 patients, one psychologist for every 60, one nurse for 
every 15, one social worker for every 35, one aid for every 
2.5 patients. This has been used by the courts even though 
in 1969 the American Psychiatric Association revised its 
position and no longer required minimum ratios. 
141 
349 F.Supp. 575 (S.D. N.Y. 1972). 
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professional personnel to the patients, the training and 
poor conununication among the personnel and the lack of 
information about each patient to determine that the treat-
ment was inadequate. Rouse v. Catneron142 and Wyatt v. 
Stickney143 analyzed the size of the institution, staff-
patient ratios and per capita costs. In Wyatt, for example, 
the court found having the ratio of one physician per 
5,000 patients could not provide adequate treatment. 
While the criteria for evaluation and evaluation it-
self are relatively simple, under the structural approach 
a facility may be structurally adequate and still not provide 
effective treatment. The mere presence of a sufficient 
number of staff does not mean they will actually treat patients. 
Mere availability of treatment modalities without optimal com-
binations for each patient will not amount to treatment. 
Structural aspects concerning size, expenditure and staff 
training may be useful in a broad range of analyzing treat-
ment, but not treatment outcome. 144 
142 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
143 334 F.Supp. 1341 (M,D. Ala, 1972). 
144
schwitzgebel,R., Harvard Civil Rights.--CiVil Liberties 
Law Review, supra. 
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The process of treatment delivery as an evaluation tool 
examines whether or not the treatment purportedly available 
at the institution is actually delivered to the mentally 
retarded person. This type o:f review was required in Wyatt 
where the court required treatment plans, periodic review and 
a record of therapy. 145 Use of such an evaluative tool in a 
Missouri study revealed that the average patient in mental 
health centers spent only 2.01 hours per week in traditional 
forms of individual and group therapy, but the average 
patient in state hospitals spent only .31 hours per week in 
146 these types of therapy. A review of patients' treatment 
plans will show whether an effective treatment plan was 
implemented with direct service to the patient. While this 
criterion for evaluation may accuratley measure delivery of 
services, it also has deficiencies. For example, if 
commonly accepted practices are inadequate, an impressive 
145 344 F.Supp. 373, 384-385 (M.D. Ala. 1972). 
146Evenson, Neumenhuizen, Sletten & Cho, A Computerized 
Survey of Treatment Used In Missouri Institutions. Hospital 
& Community Psychiatry, 1973, 24, 23. 
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. d b . . 1 147 delivery recor may e 1nconsequent1a • An examination 
of patient records may measure the quantity of therapy, but 
the relationship between quantity and quality is uncertain. 
A third criteria which may be used in evaluating the 
effectiveness of treatment is the treatment outcome approach. 
The question then for evaluating treatment is simply 11 What are 
the results?" Information showing the percent of patients 
released from the institution and recidivism rates might show 
the effectiveness of the institution as a whole. An effective 
treatment outcome evaluative tool is what has been called a 
contract fulfillment analysis. 148 Outpatients at a mental 
health clinic and the therapist set a treatment goal. When 
the treatment is concluded the patient and a follow-up 
worker review the contract and record the degree of ful-
fillment of the outlined goals. 
Use of the outcome approach is the most direct and 
accurate in evaluating treatment. However, a recent United 
States Supreme Court decision leaves the viability of this 
147
schwitzgebel,R., Harvard Civil Rights--Civil Liberties 
Law Review, supra. 
148Lombilla, Kiresak & Sherman, Evaluating a Community 
Mental Health Program: Contract Fulfillment Analysis, 
Hospital and Community Psychia,try, 1973, 24, 760. 
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evaluation criterion by the courts in doubt. 149 
Courts may use a combination of these three evaluative 
criteria in evaluating the adequacy of the treatment pro-
vided. These three criteria, particularly the latter, may 
be of value to mental health professionals as well in eval-
. . 150 
uat1ng the adequacy of treatment given. 
SUMMARY 
Archaic models have inhibited acceptance of modern 
psychological theories for dealing with mental retardation. 
Much legislation and judicial opinions presuppose the validity 
of the archaic models. Litigation involving the right to 
treatment and interdisciplanary activities and publications 
are discrediting the archaic models. 
The normalization principle is generally recognized by 
psychologists and those in special education and has been 
implemented not only in Sweden but also attempts are being 
149oonaldson v. O'Connor, supra. (The appellate court 
said that the mentally, retarded had a right to such treat-
ment as would cure or at least improve each mentally retarded's 
condition, The Supreme Court vacated this opinion with Chief 
Justice Bul;'ger in a concurring opinion indicating the courts 
could not require any kind of outcome.) 
150Moos & Schwartz, Treatment Environment and Treatment 
Outcome, Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease, 1972, 154, 
264, found no clear relationship between staff-patient ratios 
and success in the communities. 
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lt\s.de in the UnLted States, ImJ?lementing the normalization 
principle will have great impact on the lives of the mentally 
retarded and the facilities purJ?ortedly or actually serving 
them. Normalization requires moving the mentally retarded 
out of the institution and into the community, providing 
therapeutic activities in sheltered workshops, integration 
in classrooms, residing in family .... like settings, and less 
restriction under the law. 
As will be discussed in Chapter IV, courts are now 
examining the treatment offered the mentally retarded and 
have developed standards for evaluating the treatment the 
mentally retarded are receiving. It is important both in the 
evaluative process and in the delivery of services to recog-
nize that treatment is an ongoing process affected by the 
total environment. It has been suggested that behavioral 
procedures for the mentally retarded have as specific objec-
tives: 
1) to increase competence to cope with the environment; 
2) to foster increasingly more complex adaptive behavior, 
and 
3) to enhance human qualities. 151 
151 
Guidelines for the Use of Behavioral ~rocedure in 
State Programs for Retarded persons, Monograph, Arlington, 
Texas: National Association for Retarded Citizens, 1976. 
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CHAPTER III 
LAW AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED: AN OVERVIEW 
The development of the law at it affects the rights of 
the mentally disabled has been.dependent on three factors: 
1) the extent of medical knowledge on cause, care and proper 
treatment of the mentally disabled; 2) the degree to which 
the politically organized community has acknowledged its 
responsibility for the care and treatment of its afflicted 
citizens; and 3) the legal profession's awareness of the 
social realities of mental disability, as well as the acute-
ness of its concern for those who neither have relatives nor 
close friends to safeguard their rights. 152 In each of these 
areas, there are new interests or developments in mental 
retardation, which make mental retardation a contemporary 
inter-disciplinary issue; 1) research with the mentally 
retarded, discussed in Chapter II, is revealing a new picture 
of retardation in a developmental model; 2) society seems 
152 
Brackel & Rock, supra. 
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ready to participate in the problems of the retarded; 153 and 
3) the courts and legislatures are resolving legal rights. 
Recent developments in securing the rights of the 
mentally retarded to habilitation have been the result of 
increased scienti-fic understanding of mental retardation and 
recognition that ancient legal restrictions and definitions 
are inconsistent with this new understanding. Progress is 
being made to establish a legal right to treatment, but pre-
requisite to sustained legal rights is increased public and 
professional education of the great developmental potential 
of the mentally retarded. The change is sometimes slow due 
to a long history of misconceptions regarding mental retard-
ation. Conflicts in theory, laws, and treatment practices 
have resulted in the modern treatment controversies. 
Historical traditions, stereotypes and beliefs con-
cerning mental retardation, and desires of legislators and 
judges to assist the mentally retarded while protecting society 
have resulted in laws spec~fically for the mentally retard.-
ed.154 These special rules include; l} civil commitment; 155 
153see pages 19-21 for a discussion of four organizations. 
Additional organizations are enumerated and discussed in 
Gearheart & Litton, supra. 
154 . d d h. Kin re , Co en, supra. 
1550RS Chapt. 427. 
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2) legal incompetency; 156 3) guardianship or conservator-
ship to manage the daily financial and personal affairs of 
l.J57 the person; 4)criminal law;l58 5) restrictions on com-
munity rights such as entering into any contract~59 making 
· 11 160 b i ' • · 1 • t 161 b • • d , I a wi , r nging civi sui s, o taining a river s 
license, testifying in court as a witness and serving as a 
juror;1~ 2 and 6) restrictions on personal rights and family 
life such as sterilization, annulment of marriage and in-
voluntary adoption of his children.lb'3 The areas of law 
enumerated above as they impinge upon the personal liberty 
of the mentally retarded are discussed in this chapter. 
15{) 
Id. 
157 
ORS Chapt. 126. 
158 
ORS Chapt. 161. 
159 
Gindhart v. Skourtes, 271 Or. 115, 530 P.2d 827 (1975). 
160 
ORS Chapt. 112. 
161 
Mullen v. Bruce, 168 Cal.App. 2d 494, 335 P.2d 945 
(1959). 
162 
See ORS 482.120 regarding driver's license. 
163 
ORS 109.310. 
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he will be co:mmi.tted. 166 l.n ac.tuql p;cactice the involuntary 
commitment procedure ;for the mentally deficient is rarely 
usea. 167 
Once the actual decision to commit is made the mentally 
deficient person remains in the facility except for any leaves 
of absence. The person is re-examined some time after com-
mitment to determine whether he should remain. The mentally 
ill person may be committed for a period not to exceed 
166oRS 427.062. The statutes relating to involuntary 
commitment of the mentally ill contain more procedural .require-
ment. s including appointment of an attorney unless exprtjssly 
waived; the mentally ill person will be committed if mentally 
ill and in need of treatment, care or custody because ~e 
suffers from a mental disorder and is dangerous to him~elf 
or others or is unable to provide for his basic person~l needs. 
there will be at least two hearings and unlike the men~ally 
retarded person who is simply told that he has the rig~t to 
be represented by an attorney the judge will appoint am 
attorney to represent the mentally ill person ''unless counsel, 
is expressly, knowingly and intelligently refused by the 
person." ORS 426.100(2). Strict proof is required showing 
that the person is dangerous to himself or others .or unable 
to provide for his basic needs before he may be committed. 
State v. O'Neil, 274 Or. 59, 545 P.2d 96 (1976). 
167statistics show only one in Multnomah County, Oregon 
for the year 1976. (Multnomah County Probate Court, telephone 
conversation, DEc., 1976). The majority of those mentally 
retarded who are committed are committed "voluntarily" while 
they are minors by their parents. The mentally ill-mentally 
retarded categories are not mutually exclusive and in Oregon 
many go through the commitment procedures for the mentally ill 
because it is simpler. Inter-insititutional transfer is not 
difficult and the mentally retarded individual may then be 
transferred after being committed. (Interview with Jeffrey s. 
Mutnick, formerly with Multnomah County Public Defender's 
Office. Jan. 5, 1976). 
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CIVIL COMMITMENT 
In Oregon, involuntary commitment of the mentally 
deficient may be commenced by "any citizen" filing a petition 
with the county probate judge. The petition must allege that 
the person who is the subject of the petition is mentally 
d f . . t d . d f t d t . . 1'&4 e ic1en an in nee o care, cus o y or raining. The 
judge then examines the petition and observes the person per-
sonally at a hearing. If after "viewing" the person and 
reviewing the petition, the judge thinks that the person is 
in need of care, custody or training, the judge orders a 
precommitment mental and physical examination at Fairview 
Training Center in Salem or some other suitable institutionl65 
The person must be examined in seven days and findings of 
deficiency and recommendations forwarded to the court within 
30 days. The court conducts another hearing after receiving 
the recommendations. If the court determines the person is 
mentally deficient and in need of care, custody or training 
164 
ORS 427. 015. (Present statutes use the term mentally 
deficient. SB 79 introduced in the 1977 Oregon Legislature 
substituted the term mentally retarded for mentally deficient 
among many.,, . .o:ther- chan9es ., The bill, however, never got out 
of committee • ) 
1650RS 427.025. 
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180 days~ 168 He will onlx be held beyond that period if the 
treating facility certifies to the judge that the person is 
still mentally ill. The mentally ill person may protest and 
have a hearing before the judge. :rf he is found mentally ill 
he will remain in the institution, but again only for 180 
days unless the above procedure is followed. 169 
A person may voluntarily seek admission to a mental 
health facility, 170 but many question whether for the mentally 
d f . . k' f . . 1 171 e icient person, as ing or commitment is ever vo untary. 
In the case of a minor or incompetent person, the admission, 
even though termed t1voluntary" may not be voluntary, because 
the application must be made by the parent or person entitled 
to custody. 172 Whoever makes the application, the person 
thought to be mentally retarded is examined at the mental 
health facility and admitted if found in need of care, custody 
or training. The person who is voluntarily admitted as a 
1680RS 426.130. 
1690RS 426.301. 
170oRS 427,210~260. 
171Kind;red, Cohen et al., supra\ 
172oRS 427.220. 
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minor whether mentally ill or mentally retarded by his parents 
will be examined by a physician and psychologist and based 
upon their report will either be released or committed as an 
involuntary patient~ 17 3 
Once admitted the mentally deficient person can be re-
leased only upon 30 days written notice unless the facility 
successfully petitions the court to have the person's status 
h d f 1 . 1 t l 7 4 Th t ' t c ange rom vo untary to invo un ary. e no ice mus 
indicate the proposed future treatment plan. There are several 
discrepancies between the rights afforded the mentally def ic-
ient and mentally ill in Oregon: one of these is the volun-
tarily admitted mentally ill patient can be released in 72 
hours of his request unless his status is changed through the 
courts from voluntary to involuntary. 
LEGAL INCOMPETENCY 
Voluntary admission or involuntary commitment to a 
mental health facility does not mean that the person is 
1730RS 427,250. Bal:;'tley v. Kremens, 402 F.Supp. 1039 
(E.D. Pa. 1975). 
174 
ORS 427.225.-240, 
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legaliy incompetent.
175 
If a jud9e finds a committed person 
incompetent, a guardian will be appointed for the person. 
In addition, the person will be unable to enter into a con-
t t k '11 b . d . ' ' l' 176 rac , ma e a w1 , or o ta1n a river s 1cense. Any 
subsequent marriage may be annuled as well. 
Procedural requirements must be followed before a per-
son is found incompetent because the person suffers a·serious 
loss of liberty even beyond commitment. First, a hearing 
instigated by the person, his guardian, relative or creditor, 
or other interested person, must be held before the probate 
judge. 177 The person must appear and be informed of his right 
to an attorney and subpoena wi tnes'ses. The judge will appoint 
an attorney to represent him unless the person "expressly, 
knowingly and intelligently refused legal counsel. 11178 The 
175oRS 427.305. "Incompetency" is not defined; however, 
statutes relating to appointment of a guardian define an 
"incapacitated person as one ••who is unable, without assis-
tance, to properly manage or take care of himself or his 
personal affairs." ORS 126,003. Presumably, a similar 
standard would be used to determine incompetency. 
176Each of these is discussed later. A person may not 
be able to do any of the things listed even though not found 
legally incompetent. 
177
o:RS 427.31.0. 
178Id. (It would seem that when competency is at issue 
legal counsel would be necessary since one might not be in a 
positition to intelligently and knowingly refuse.} 
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court may appoint any private physician to examine the mental 
condition of the person~79 
When the mentally ill or mentally retarded person is 
released from the mental health facility, he will be found 
competent if the chief medical officer believes him to be. 
If not, the mentally retarded person, his guardian, relative, 
creditor, or other interested person, may petition the court 
for a hearing~SO If he is still found incompetent, the 
guardian will remain and the other restrictions outlined 
earlier will continue until or if a legal designation of 
competency is restored. 
GUARDIANSHIP 
A guardian or conservator may be appointed for any per-
son including the mentally deficient person without any legal 
finding of incompetency required. A guardianship is created 
for the protection of the person's property. To have a 
guardian appointed the judge must find the person incapac-
itated (Unable to take care of himself or his personal affairs) 
and the appointment of a guardian is necessary or desirable 
179 
ORS 427.325. 
180 
ORS 427.310(3). 
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as a mea.ns of providing continuing care and supervision of 
181 
the person. The procedure commences by the incapacitated 
person, or any person interested in his welfare, petitioning 
the probate court for appointment of a guardian. If anyone 
objects to the petition, the court will appoint an attorney 
to represent the alleged incapacitated person, a physician to 
examine the person, and an officer, employee or appointee to 
the court to interview the person and prepare a report. If 
objections to the petition are raised, the person may be 
present at the hearing to hear or see evidence relating to 
his condition, and may through his attorney present evidence, 
and cross-examine the witnesses including the court appointed 
physician and interviewer. If requested the hearing will be 
closed to the public. 182 
The guardian may be any person qualified and willing to 
serve, but the court gives preference to relatives and to 
persons requested by the incapacitated person in writing while 
183 he was competent. A gua~dian so appointed remains the 
guardian of the person until the guardian or the ward (the 
181
oRS 126.107. 
182oRS 126.103. 
183
0RS 126.035. 
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incapacitated person for whom the guaz-dianship was created): 
1) dies, 2} becomes incapacitated, 3} is removed or resigns, 
or 4) the court orders that the incapacity no longer ex-,: 
. t· 184 J.S S. Once appointed, the guardian acts as a parent of 
the ward. He may have custody, arrange for training and ed-
ucation, take care of the ward's personal property, consent 
to medical and professional care and dispose of the ward's 
property to meeet limited expenses unless a conservator has 
been appointed. 
Appointment of a conservator is similar to appointment 
of a guardian. A conservator may be appointed to manage a 
person's property if the court finds he is unable to manage 
his property and affairs effectively because of mental illness 
or mental deficiency afid~-has pr0perty or money in nEfed of 
management. If the mentally deficient person has nt friends 
or relatives willing to serve as guardian or conservator 
and the Board of County Commissioners determines oni should 
be appointed, a public guardian and conservator may/be appoint-
ed by the court under the same p~ocedures discussed 1 above. 185 
Guardianship is intended to protect a person tho can-
1 
not care for himself. The statute does not provide/ for an 
examination or even interview by a person trained ih psychol .... 
ogy. The guardian, who may be a relative, is to prbvided for 
! 
1840RS 126.137. 
185 ORS 126.905, 126.925. 
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the education and training of the mentally deficient person. 
There is no provision for professional assistance in select-
ing the appropriate training or education for the individual. 
If rehabilitation or habilitation is the goal, the statutes 
should specifically provide for professional assistance in 
selection, training and education. A conservatorship is 
less for the benefit of the incapacitated person than for 
the children, creditors and even the state to whom the person 
may be indebted. It is designed to protect the assets of the 
person and to see that his needs are met financially. Two 
problems exist: l} the statute ,tates that the court must 
find that the person cannot effectively manage his affairs, 
but does not offer further explanation; and 2} again no 
provision is made for examination or interview by a person 
trained in psychology. Few individuals manage financial 
affairs as effectively as possible. Unwise investments are 
made and unnecessary goods and services are bought. Further-
more, management of financial affairs, however ineptly, may 
result in a sense of accomplishment encouraging self-reliance 
or perhaps the seeking of additional training. 
A serious question as to the advisability of a guard-
ianship exists when the advice and provision of social services 
would serve as we11. 186 In many cases limited guardianship or 
186 
Kindred et al., supra. 
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conservato;rship with less restrictive controls, giving the 
wal."d or protected person an opportunity to participate to the 
fullest extent possible in the decisions affecting his life 
and property may be more effective than the traditional forms. 
CRIMINAL LAW 
In Oregon criminal law, a person may not be legally 
guilty of criminal conduct because: 1) a mental disease or 
defect causes him to lack sufficient mental capacity to ap-
preciate the criminality of his conduct or 2) a mental dis-
ease or defect prevents him from conforming his conduct to 
the requirements of the law. 187 If the criminal defendant is 
found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect he may 
be committed to a mental health facility. He will be committed 
if he: 1) is still affected by mental disease or defect at the 
time of the hearing, 2) is a danger to himself or others, and 
3) would not be a proper subject for release or supervision 
by a person appointed by the court, the Oregon Mental Health 
188 
Division or a community mental health program. 
A person may be committed without a finding by the 
court or jury that he is not guilty because of a mental dis-
ease or defect if he is found incompetent to appear before 
187 
ORS 161 • 2 9 5 (1) • 
188 
ORS 161.340. 
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h . d . f . 1 189 t e JU ge or Jury or tria • r:e the person later becomes 
competent he may be tried ;for the crime unless at least five 
years have elapsed from the time of the court's finding of 
incompetency and he has been committed to a mental health 
facility during this five year period. 190 A trial would be 
unjust after five years. 
A person who has been committed as the result of 
cirminal law proceedings may be discharged if any of the 
following three things occur: 1) at any time after admission 
to a state mental health facility, the superintendent after 
examining the person is of the opinion that the person is no 
longer affected by a mental disease or defect, or if still 
affected no longer presents a substantial danger to himself 
or others; 2) after 90 days of custody the person, whether 
mentally ill or mentally deficient, successfully applies to 
the circuit court for discharge on the grounds stated in (1) 
above; or 3) after five years of custody, unless the court 
finds he is still affected by a mental disease or defect and 
is a substantial danger to himself or others. 191 
189 161 36 . . . ORS , O, A person lS incompetent to stand trial 
if he is unable Ca.1 to unde;J;'stand the nature of the proceedings 
against him; or {bl to assist and cooperate with his counsel; 
or {c) to participate in his defense. 
l 9 00RS 161. 370 
191
oRS 161,340, 161.350. 
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The court must conduct hearings to determine whether 
or not the person still suffers from a mental disease or 
defect, or if so affected does not present a substantial 
dilln.ger to himself or others unless the superintendent of 
the mental health facility files a report recommending dis-
charge and the state does not objec~192 At the hearing 
psychiatrists and psychologists will be called upon to ex-
amine the person and testify concerning his condition. 
RESTRICTIONS IN THE COMMUNITY 
The mentally retarded or the mentally ill person may be 
unable to enter into a contract, make a will, bring a civil 
suit or obtain a driver's license. In most states a con-
tract which a mentally deficient person has entered into 
may be ,voided if there is an inadequate consideration, fraud, 
1 k f d f . h '193 11 or a ac o goo ait • In Oregon, a contract a menta y 
incompetent person has entered into may be .voided if the 
person is incompetent to transact business and the contract 
194 is g!.'lossly unfair. For the non-retarded a contract may not 
be avoided simply because it is unfair, 
192 lc:m-5 :lfil~.345 ~ 
193 
Allen,R.C., Feister,E.Z. & Weinhofen,H., Mental Im-
pairment and Legal Competency, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: 
Prentice~Hall, 1968. 
194 
Gindhart v. Skourtes, 271 Or. 115, 530 P.wd 827 (1975) 
Scovil v. Barney, 4 Or. 288 (1872) {A mentally deficient per-
son who deeded property to another for less than its value was 
entitled to have his property returned because of incompetency.) 
86 
What constitutes the ;req;uisite competency is left to 
the discretion of the judge in each case. Mental capacity to 
enter into a contract requires that the person has ability to 
comprehend the nature of the transaction. However, mere dull-
ness of intellect, ability to be easily influenced and depen-
dency upon others does not make the person incompetent. The 
question is not whether the person understood the contract, 
but was capable of understanding it,195 
To make a valid will the person must be of sound mind 
at the time he makes the will. 196 If the will of a person 
is challenged on the ground that the testator 1 the person who 
made the will, was not of "sound mind" at the time, the court 
will consider whether the person: 1) comprehended the nature 
of the act in which he was engaged; 2) knew the nature and 
extent of all of his property at the time; 3) had in mind 
195 
~ruse v. Coos Head Timber co., 248 Or. 294, 432 P,2d 
1009 (1967) (Person unable to read some words in contraot .. 
with 83 I.Q., fifth grade performance level and easily in-
fluenced but who had been employed in manual labor was found 
to be of normal1 although belo~ average intelligence and, 
therefor~, competent to enter into contract.) 
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the persons who were, should, or might be, the objects of 
his bounty; and 4) was cognizant of the scope and provisions 
f h . . · 11 1~ 7 b . t t f o is written wi • A person may e in a s a e o 
"extreme imbecility 11 and yet possess sufficient understanding 
to direct how his property should be disposed.1'9·a 
The person who made the will is presumed to have been 
of sound mind unless he had a guardian at the time he made 
the will. If he had a guardian, there is a presumption that 
. 199 he lacked the mental capacity to execute a will. That 
presumption may be overcome by testimony of persons seeking 
200 201 to enforce the will. In a recent Arizona case a testator 
functioning at a mental level of 10-12 years but able to do 
simple tasks and drive a car was found to have necessary 
197 
Vsetecka v. Novak, 4 Or.App. 463, 478 P.2d 655 (1970). 
198 
Chrisman v. Chrisman, 16 Or. 127, 18 Pac. 6 (1888). 
199 
In re Provolt's Estate, 175 Or. 128, 151 P.2d 736 {1944). 
200 
Whittenberry v. Whittenberry, 9 Or.App. 154, 496 P.2d 
240 (1972) (Decedent who two months before he made his will 
had been found incompetent by an examining psychiatrist, was 
found competent to make a will based on the testimony of lay 
witnesses to the signing of the will that he seemed normal.) 
201 
In re Teel 1 s Estate, 14 Ariz.App. 371, 483 P.2d 603 
{1971). 
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capacity to execute a will, While the capacity level re<:;tuired 
to make a will is low, litigation contesting the validity of 
a mentally disabled person's will may dissipa,te the estate 
and, the will may be found invalid, To help avoid litigation 
it may be advisable for the possibly mentally retarded person 
to be examined by a psychologist just prior to executing his 
will. Knowing that a psychologist will testify as to the 
person's competency will discourage most people from contest-
ing the will. Of course, except for money obtained through 
inheritance and somehow not expended for care or treatment, 
the mentally retarded person with a substantial estate is 
rare. 202 
The mentally deficient person may sue and be sued in 
civil cases for most torts.. He may not be sued for torts 
. . l' . t 203 requiring ma ice or inten • 
Even if it is deemed incongruous to hold an insane 
person liable in damages for an injury inflicted by 
an act which his infirmity rendered impossible to 
restriin, it is reasonable to hold the insane person 
liable under the principle that when one of two in-
nocent persons must suffer a ~8~s, it should be borne 
by the one who occasioned it. 
Unless the mentally retarded person has been adjudged 
incompetent or placed under a guardianship, he may sue or be 
202 . d d 1 Kin re et a., supra. 
203Asch, supra. 
204 41 Am.Jur. 2d, Incompetent Persons §104. Rochester, 
New York: Lawyer's Cooperative Publishing Co., 1967. 
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sued in his own name. 205 If e;l.ther of the above has occurred 
the mentally deficient may sue or be sued through his guardian. 
If he is incompetent to bring or defend an action, a guardian 
will be appointed ad litem (for the sole purpose of bringing 
or defending the action1. 206 
The mentally deficient person may bring an action or 
defend one but be unable to testify in his own behalf at trial 
if he is of unsound mind. 207 Those mental defeo.<ta._ which in-
terfere with the ability to perceive and communicate disqualify 
a witness as being incompetent to testify • 
A person who has been committed to a state institution 
for the mentally deficient and found mentally retarded cannot 
b • d ' I l' 208 o tain a river s icense. Even if he has not been com-
mitted or found mentally deficient, he may be denied, a driver's 
license if the Oregon Motor Vehicle Division determines that 
the person is suffering from mental disability which pro-
hibits his operation of a motor vehicle or his understand-
ing of highway si9ns. 209 
205 
Id. 
206
oRS 13,051. 
207
oRS 44.030. 
208ons 482~120(2}. 
209oRS 482.130. 
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Under Oregon Motor Vehicle Division regulations, persons 
applying far a driver's license must take a written examination 
and demonstrate to an examiner competency to operate a motor 
vehicle. If the person appears to the division "to be affected 
with or suffering from any physical or mental disability or 
disease which might affect his operation of a motor vehicle," 
the applicant may 1) be required to demonstrate personally 
that notwithstanding such disease or defect he is a proper 
person to operate a motor vehicle, 2) be required to submit 
to an examination by the State Health Officer who reports to 
the division the results of the examination, 3) have his 
physician send a rep:oart to the State Health Officer and 4) 
µo 
be examined by a specialist designated by the division. 
The major difficulty with the statutes and accompanying 
regulations is that they leave to the discretion of state 
employees in the Motor Vehicle Division whether or not the 
person appears to be suffering a mental disability. As a 
consequence a person whom a psychologist might find only 
a borderline retarded,fully competent to drive an automobile, 
may be required to obtain various reports and submit to various 
examinations not required by other applicants. 
210 
ORS 482.240. 
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RESTRICTIONS ON )?ERSONAL RlGHTS AND FA.MILY LIFE 
The mentally deficient person may also have restrictions 
placed upon his personal rights and family life by being 
sterilized, having his marriage annuled, and having his child-
ren adopted against his will. With the discovery of the vas-
ectomy as a relatively safe method o;f sterilization in the 
1920's statutes authorizing sterilization were adopted in 
many states. 211 Challenges to the constitutionality of the 
statutes were rejected, 212 and they continue to exist in most 
states.213 Under Oregon law a mentally dificient person may 
be sterilized to prevent procreation. 214 He is entitled to 
a hearing where he may be represented by an attorney. 
211Brackel & R k oc , supra. 
212suck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (A mentally defic-
int 18 year old woman who was the daughter of a mentally de-
ficient mother and who had a mentally deficient child herself 
unsuccessfully challenged a statute under which a judge order-
ed her sterilized. In holding that the statute did not violate 
the woman's right to due process as guaranteed by the Four-
teenth Amendment of the united States Constitution, Justice 
Holmes stated, nthree gene:i:;ations of imbeciles are enough." 
213Brackel & Rock, supra. 
214oRS 436.050, 436.070. Cook v. Sta,te, 9 Or.App. 224, 
495 P.2d 768 (1972) (Evidence that 17 year old girl had a 
history of severe emotional disturbance, .indiscriminate and 
impulsive sexual involvements while in state hospital, and 
brain damage making her condition unstable despite medication 
supported determination that sterilization was warranted.) 
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From 1940 to 1960 Oregon was one of the six states that 
averaged more than 15 sterilizatj:.ons pe;i:- year. In most states 
except for North Carolina which involuntarily sterilized 240 
people in 1963 alone, the number of mentally deficient steril-
ized were much lower. 215 Today the number of involuntary 
sterilizations in Oregon and other states are even lower. 
However so-called "voluntary" sterilization as a condition 
for release from an institution or to avoid being sent there 
in the first place is more frequent. 216 Sterilization of 
person who are receiving benefits under federally funded 
programs is not permitted unless the sterilization is 
217 
voluntary. 
The propriety of using sterilization as a means of 
reducing the number of mentally deficient persons has been 
challenged on the grounds that heredity is not the primary 
cause of mental deficiency. Birth injuries and thyroid 
deficiencies may also cause mental deficiency. 218 Requiring 
states to furnish sex education and access to contraceptive 
devices to all of its ci.tizens has been .suggested as a 
215arackel & Rock, supra. 
216Kindred et a.l., supra.. 
217Relf and Human Rights Organization v~ Matthews, 
403 F.Supp. 1234 (D.D.C 1975}. 
218Brackel & Rock, supra. See also the etiology of men-
tal retardation discussed in Chapter II. 
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alternative to statutes permitting involuntary sterilization 
and reducing the number o;f "voluntary" sterilizations. 219 
A mentally deficient person may have his marriage 
annuled. Procedurally, an action to have the marriage annuled 
is brought by the filing of a petition for annulment on the 
ground that one or both of the parties was incapable of making 
the contract or consenting to it "for want of legal age or 
sufficient understanding.n 220 The marriage then becomes void 
when it is declared void by the court. 221 To warrant an 
annulment there must be insufficient mental capacity to 
comprehend the nature and consequences of the business in 
which the party was engaged, as required in other contracts. 222 
It has been suggested that if a state wishes to enforce 
its prohibition against the marriage of the mentally deficient, 
219Kindred et al., supra. It is questionable whether 
the agreed sterilization of a person desiring federal or 
state aid or to avoid institutionalization is in fact 
"voluntary," since it is agreed to under what could amount 
to duress or may not be agreed to by the parent or guardian 
of the person and not the person himself, 
220oRS 107,105(1)~ 
221
oRS 106.030. 
222
coleman v. Coleman, BS or. 99, 166 P. 47 (1917). 
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it should use something other than annulment, such as check.:.. 
ing applications for a marriage license against a central 
record for all incompetent or hospitalized persons or re-
quiring a physician's statement~ 23 Under the current 
system mentally retarded persons in similar circumstances 
may be treated unequally, and the annulment, which may not 
be granted until several years after the marriage, always 
occurs after the fact. Others have suggested that in our 
prese~t state of knowledge, there is no data to justify 
application of a different rule to mentally deficient persons. 
The risk of marriage ending in failure is applicable to all 
persons, mentally deficient or not. 224 
In Oregon the child of a mentally deficient person may 
be adopted by another even though the mentally deficient 
person does not consent to the adoption~ 2 ~ Procedurally, 
any person seeking to adopt a child petitions the court for 
an adoption order. 226 If a natural parent has been found 
incompetent as discussed above and remains so at the time of 
223 
Brackel & Rock. 
2-24 
Kindred et al., supra. 
225 
ORS 109.322. 
226 
ORS 109.310. 
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the adoption proceedings, a c;i,tation is served upon his 
guardian if he has one. The citation orders him to appear 
in court at a certain time to show cause why the adoption 
of the child should not be decreed. A hearing is held and 
if the court finds that the "wel;fare of the child will be 
best promoted through the adoption of the child," the adop-
tion will be decreed even though the mentally ilL.or mentally 
deficient person objects to the adoption. If the natural 
parent has not been adjudged mentally ill or deficient, no 
adoption will be decreed without his consent. Consequently 
where one of the parents is mentally ill or mentally deficient, 
but has not been decreed by a court to be so, and the parent 
does not consent to his child•s adoption, the prospective 
adoptive parent must bring an action to have the parent 
decreed incompetent because of mental illness or deficiency 
before proceeding. 
The rule permitting adoption of a mentally deficient 
parent's child without his consent has been criticized. There 
is no data to supvort a general finding that retarded parents 
226 
are bad parents, 
Intellectual retardation is just one of the reasons 
for personal incompetence within the areas of family 
life and child-rearing, but is one of the high-risk 
groups in which the incompetence tends to persist 
over long periods of time. When one looks around 
226 
Kindred et al., supra. 
and sees the number of children who are under the 
care of non-retarded persons who are incompetent 
to the task, living in squalor, ignorance and suf-
fering, one wonders whether the principle outlined 
here for dealing with the 2l2!?tarded do not apply equally as well to us all •. 
Traditional views of what is proper parental behavior to meet 
h b . f h' . . '228 t e est interests o the c ild may be inappropriate. 
The.noninstitutionalized mentally retarded have some 
protection in employment and utilization of public accommoda-
229 tion and amusement in Oregon. For example, it is unlaw-
ful to refuse to hire a person because he has a mental handi-
cap unless it prevents the performance of the work involvedf30 
The federal government has an tnteragency Committee on 
Handicapped Employees to encourage employment of mentally 
disabled persons in federal agencies or federally funded 
. 231 pro)ects. Some have suggested that the federal government 
227 
Brackel & Rock, supra. 
228 
Batt,J., Child Custody Disputes: A Developmental 
Psychological Approach to Proof and Decisionmaking, Willamette 
Law Journal, 1976, 12, 491. 
229 
ORS 659.352, 659.425. 
23,0 
ORS 659.425(1). 
231 
29 USC § 791. 
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insure the economic security of the mentally retarded by 
. . 232 h . . . . h 
making direct payments to them; owever, it is per aps 
of equal importance that a person experience well be.img from 
having a meaningful, satisfying job with opportunities for 
233 training and advancement. 
In Oregon mentally retarded children must be provided 
special education. 234 However since placement in a special 
class or schools carries a stigma235 courts have held that 
procedural safeguards of notice and hearing to determine 
that the educational placement will benefit rather than harm 
the child must be satisfied. 236 
232Kindred et al., supra. 
233Farber ,B., Mental Retardation, Its Social Context a·nd 
Social Consequences, Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1968. 
234
oRS 343.221. Education is the principal method for 
the mentally retarded to achieve habilitation (defined in 
Chapter II). There is a growing body of litigation and 
legislation concerning education for the mentally retarded. 
Except for a brief review, this paper will not examine edu-
cation for the mentally retarded. Court decisions have treat-
ed treatment and education separately despite their close 
relationship. 
235 
Kindred et al., supra. 
236 
Pennsylvania Association for :Retarded Children v. 
Pennsylvania, 343 F,Supp. 279 (E.D. Pa. 1972). 
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Preference must be given to placement in the regular classroom 
with appropriate ancillary services rather than placement in 
a special class. 237 In Lar·ry P. v. Riles, 238 the court held 
that students wrongfully placed in classes for the mentally 
retarded were irreparably harmed. Consequently the school 
had to show that its placement based on I.Q. test scores was 
rationally related to the purpose of segregating students 
according to their ability to learn. It has been suggested 
that the school have the affirmative duty of notifying parents 
1) of the specific learning problem, 2) the reasons for the 
determination that the child cannot be successfully served 
in the regular classroom, 3) the results of any medical, 
psychological and educational assessment of the child, and 
4) the specific educational plan for the child. Periodic 
review of the child's progress should be given to the parents. 
If the parents believe the classification is erroneous, they 
should be entitled to a hearing. 239 The Oregon Department 
of Education has promulgated rules requiring notice to parents, 
237Mills Vt Boa.rd of Education for the District of 
Columbia, 348 F.Supp. 866 (D.D.c. 1972), 
238343 F.Supp. 1306 (N.D. Cal., 1972). 
239Kindred et al., supra. 
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a hearing, and representation by an attorney to satisfy the re-
quirements suggested by the courts. 240 This kind of individ-
ual analysis with its concurrent program designed to meet the 
specific needs of the child could be provided every child. 
SU.MM.ARY 
As this chapter indicates, the law imposes a consider-
able influence on the lives of the mentally retarded whether 
institutionalized or not. In addition to commitment, the 
mentally retarded may have his personal decisions delegated 
to an appointed guardian or conservator, his contracts 
voided, his will disregarded, his marriage annuled and his 
children adopted against his will. All restrictions have a 
long history. Recently legislatures have adopted statutes 
requiring that certain procedures be followed before these 
restrictions may be imposed, particularly for involuntary 
commitment and in criminal law proceedings. 
Throughout its long history of involvement, the law 
has been concerned with restricting the mentally retarded 
for the protection of the mentally retarded and society. 
But there h~s been no legal provision ~or providing the men-
a;lly retarded ·with conco!Tllf1i tant treatment so the restrictions 
240 
OAR 581-15-025. 
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may be removed or at le~st alleviated, Prohibitions against 
discrimination in employment and the right of children to 
special education have been recent statutory developments 
which show a growing concern for the rights of the mentally 
retarded. 
Recent legislation and judicial opinions have indicated 
a right to treatment/habilitation for the institutionalized. 
The legal arguments for the right as raised by disgruntled 
patients or their guardians in litigation based on constitu-
tional and statutory provisions are numerous. There is no 
national consensus by the courts, however, on the legal basis 
for a mentally retarded person's right to treatment or even 
if such a right exists. In the following chapter, an analysis 
of the right to treatment and its appropriateness for judicial 
review will illustrate the current status of the right to 
treatment for the habilitation of the committed mentally 
retarded. The law's deprivation of the liberty of the 
mentally retarded who have not been committed to a mental 
health facility would suggest that treatment or habilitation 
should be afforded them as well. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE RIGHT TO TREATMENT 
The right to treatment as that term is used by legal 
writers and judges is in reality a right to habilitation. 
Habilitation has been definded as: 
the process by which the staff of the institution 
assists the resident to acquire and maintain those 
life skills which enable him to cope more effectively 
with the demands of his own person and of his environ-
ment and to raise the level of this physical, mental, 
and social efficiency. Habilitation includes but is 
not limited to programs of formal, structured educ-
ation and treatment.241 
In the law, especially judicial opinions, there must be more 
than a theoretical right to habilitation. There must be some 
legal basis for the right or it will not be enforced. Further-
more, merely the existence of a. legal ba,sis for treatment is 
not enough to activate judicial involvement. The controversy 
must be justiciable-~capa,ble of judicial review. Once those 
two preliminary requirements have been satisfied courts are 
241wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F.Supp. 387, 395 (M.D. Ala. N.D. 
1972). See Chapter II for a discussion of the normalization 
principle which is generally used by psychologists rather 
than habilitation which is used by the courts. 
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then in a position to evaluate: the adequacy of the treatment 
afforded, 
BASES FOR THE RIGHT 
There are several legal bases justifying the right to 
treatment: 1) the Fourteenth Amendment; 2) the Eighth Amend-
ment; 3) the Thirteenth Amendment; 3} statutes such as the 
Federal Civil Rights Act; and 4) a state's liability to the 
mentally retarded for money damages in negligently failing 
to provide treatment or in breaching its agreement to provide 
treatment. 
Fourteenth Amendment 
One basis for treatment recogn;ized by the court in 
242 
· d d 1 t' 'd d · Wyatt is ue process an eg:ua protec ion as provJ. e in 
the Fourteenth Amendment; 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
ab;ridg.e the privileges or immunities of citizens of 
the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within i3-s 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law, 2 
242yvya.tt v. Stickney, 344 F,Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. N.D. 
1972) aff'd sub. nom. -yryatt v, Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th 
Circ, 1974). See also James v,.. Wa.lTace, 406 F.Supp. 318 (M,D. 
A.la. 19761; welsh v~ Likens, 373 F.Supp. 487 CD.Minn., 1974); 
Davis v. Watkins, 384 F.Supp. 1196 (N,D. Oh. 1974); But see 
Donaldson v. O'Connor, 422 U.S. 957 (1975). 
243 
U.S. Const., amend. XIV. 
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The amendment does not specifically provide for treatment nor 
even mention the mentally retarded. The courts in decisions 
244 
which have been decided in various contexts have held 
that the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the mentally 
retarded receive treatment. Essentially the amendment re-
quires that no state deprive any person of life, liberty 
or property without due process of law. Courts have held 
that due process may be divided into procedural due process 
and substantive due process. Procedural due process requires 
that certain formalities such as a hearing before a judge, 
testimony by witnesses with the opportunity for the opposing 
side to cross-examine the witnesses and representation by an 
attorney at all significant stages of the proceeding, be 
complied with before any person be deprived of life, liberty 
or p~operty~45 Substantive due process requires that no 
person be deprived of his life, liberty or property for 
arbitrary reasons. There must be a legitimate state interest 
which applies even-handedly to all affected persons, 246 and 
24 \.he mentally retarded may join with others similarly 
situated in bringing a class action or as an individual act-
ing directly or through a guardian. The action may be for 
money damages, for an injunction to obtain a court order re-
quiring treatment or seeking release from the mental health 
facility under a writ of habeas corpus. 
245 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1966); Bart.ley v. Kremens, 
supra. 
246 16 Am:. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law § 550 (1964). 
a reasonable relationship between the deprivation and the 
person. 247 
Procedural due process 
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Application of the Fourteenth .Amendment was historic-
ally restricted by the courts to adult defendants in criminal 
actions. Courts ruled that due process required a prompt 
hearing before a judge and representation of the accused by 
an attorney at all significant stages of the proceedings. 248 
Procedural due process requirements were subsequently extend-
ed to include juvenile offenders. 249 The courts reasoned 
that since the criminal defendant, whether adult or juvenile, 
faced a deprivation of liberty, due process required that the 
accused's liberty not be taken away without a fair hearing. 
Recent cases have extended procedural due process re-
quirements to the mentally retarded who are faced with invol-
untary commitment to a state mental health facility. In 
Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Circ. 1968) the 
247Halpern 1 C.R., The Right to Habilitation, in Kindred 
et al., supra. 
248Gideon v. Wa,inwrig-ht, 372 U.S, 335 (1963} (Criminally 
accused felon has a right to be represented by an attorney at 
all significant stages of criminal proceedings); :Argersinger v. 
Hamlin, 407 u.s. 25 (1972) (Right to Counsel must be exer-
cised whenever any form of imprisonment may be imposed.) 
249rn re Gault, supra. 
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court held that a mentally deficient person was entitled to 
be represented by an attorney at commitment proceedings and 
to confront witnesses. Parker was committed in 1946 when he 
was nine at the request of his mother. He remained there 
continually until 1963 when he was released to the custody of 
his parents. Against the wishes of both Parker and his par-
ents, Parker was returned to the training school for the men-
tally deficient in Wyoming in 1965. He remained there until 
1968. At the time of the initial commitment in 1946 the 
state was represented by the county prosecuting attorney and 
a hearing was held where the prosecuting attorney, the certify-
ing psychologist and the mother were all present. At no time 
was Parker represented by an attorney. In holding that 
Parker's due process rights were violated by his lack of 
representation by an attorney the court stated: 
It matters not whether the proceedings be labeled 
"civil 11 or "criminal" or whether the subject matter 
be mental instability or juvenile delinquency. It 
is the likelihood of involuntary incarceration--
whether for punishment as an adult for a crime, re-
habilitation as a juvenile for delinquency, or treat-
ment and training as a feeble-minded or mental 
incompetent--which commands observance 2of the con-stitutional safeguards of due process. 5 o 
In !'artley v. Krentens 251 the federal court held that 
the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 
250 
396 F.2d at 396. 
251 
402 F.Supp. 1039,supra. 
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1966 and reg-ulations developed by the Mental Health Depart-
ment, which set out procedural requirements for the voluntary 
admission of minors, were unconstitutional. The three judge 
court determined that the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment required that minors who were "voluntarily" com-
mitted to mental health facilities were entitled to: 1) a 
probable cause hearing prior to commitment; 2) a post-commit-
ment hearing; 3) written notice of all hearings; 4) represen-
tation by an attorney at all significant stages of commitment; 
5) personal presence at all hearings; 6) commitment only upon 
a finding by clear and convincing proof of need for institu-
tionalization; and 7) the right to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses and to offer testimony of witnesses. 252 
Ba;rtley was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. On 
May 16, 1977 the Supreme Court vacated the lower court's 
decision and remanded the case for further hearings because 
of the changes in Pennsylvania statutes and regulations since 
the time of the lower court trial. Despite the Supreme Court's 
refusal to act, the initial opinion shows the extension of 
procedural due process in the commitment of the mentally 
retarded. Legislatures, aware of the va;rious court decisions, 
have provided for certain procedures before commitment. In 
Oregon, however, these procedures are restricted principally 
252 
Id. 
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to the mentally ill. 253 
Substantive Due: Proce:ss 
Courts have now held that under substantive due process 
. . . 254 the mentally retarded have a right to treatment. The court 
in Wyatt v. Stickney forged a two pronged theory based on the 
Fourteenth Amendment: 1) the parens patriae concept and 2) 
the quid pro quo concept. Under the parens patriae concept 
the State has sovereign power over its disabled citizens 
including the mentally retarded to act as a parent in making 
253
oRS Chapt. 427 provides that after a petition for 
commitment is filed by any person, the mentally retarded ap-
pear before a judge who may order a pre-commitment examination 
followed by another hearing and commitment if he is mentally 
deficient and in need of care, custody or training, ORS 427. 
015 et seq. He is informed of his right to an attorney, but 
nothing need be done to secure one for him. ORS 427.062. 
The statutes governing involuntary commitment of the mentally 
ill contain many more procedural requirements than do those 
concerning the mentally retarded. Kirkpatrick, L.C., Oregon's 
New Mental Commitment Statute: The Expanded Responsibilities 
of Courts and Counsel, Oregon Law Review, 1974, 53, 245. 
Senate Bill 79 was introduced in the 1977 Oregon'"Legislature 
in an attempt to provide more procedural safeguards for the 
mentally retarded. There are no procedural safeguards for 
''voluntary admission" of the mentally retarded or minors. 
While the proposed senate bill has no procedural safeguards 
for voluntary admission of minors, such legislation m~y be 
P,roposed regardless of the final decision in Bartley. Un-
fortunately this bill did not get out of committee for action 
on the legislative floor~ 
254 Wyatt v. Stickney, supra; Welsh v. Likens, supra. 
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decisions for them which they a,re unable to make for them-
selves, Consequently the State may deprive the mentally re-
tarded of his liberty by confining him in a mental health 
facility or, as discussed earlier, may require appointment of 
a guardian or conservator or declare the person incompetent. 
Under the quid pro quo concept when the state takes away the 
mentally retarded's liberty, it must offer something in return. 
The "something" is treatment, reasonably designed to alleviate 
the need for continued loss of liberty. 255 Based on this two 
pronged theory the court in Wyatt held that substantive due 
process under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a men-
tally retarded person committed to a state mental health facil-
ity must recieve treatment. The court reasoned: 1) civil 
commitment curtails individual liberty; 2) loss of liberty is 
predicated on a need for treatment; 3) the mentally retarded 
will be released when he is able to care for himself; 4) due 
process requires that he be given a reasonable chance to be 
cured. 256 
255 yvyatt v, Stickney~ su}?rai See Martella v. Kelly, 
359 f.Supp. (S.D, N,Y. 191731 (Effect,j,ve t,::eatment must be 
the quid pro guo for society's right to exercise control over 
civilly committed children,) 
256
comment: Wyatt v. Stickney and the right of Civilly 
Committed Mental Patients to A.dequate Treatment, Harvard Law 
Review, 197 3, 86, 1282. 
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In ~ya,:t'J: a group of Alaba.ma employees in a state mental 
health fac;i~ity b;rom;J'ht a class action challenging a state 
decision to terminate their employment because of budgetary 
cutbacks. The guardians of the mentally ill at the facility 
and finally the guardians of the mentally retarded at other 
facilities joined the class action as plaintiffs. They 
challenged the treatment, or lack of it, which the mentally 
disabled were receiving at state mental health facilities. 
District Court Judge Johnson heard testimony from many mental 
health professionals and from hospital and staff members. He 
ultimately concluded that under the Fourteenth Amendment the 
mentally deficient were entitled to adequate treatment. The 
defendant administrators of the state facilities in Alabama 
and Governor George Wallace appealed to the Fifth Circuit. 
However the Court of Appeals affirmed the district judge's 
decision and held that civilly committed mental patients 
have a constitutional right to receive such individual treat-
ment as will help each of them to be cured or improve his or 
her mental condition, The court also affirmed the district 
court order that the defendants implement an elaborate set 
of standards of treatment, establish human rights com-
mittees at the institutions and prepare and file reports with-
in six months concerning the implementation of the standards 
of treatment ordered by the court. 257 
257 
Wyatt v. Aderholt, supra. 
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Equal Protection 
Equal protection requires that all persons be treated 
alike under similar circumstances both in privileges conferred 
d 1 . b'l' . d 258 an ia i ity impose • Courts must scrutinize classif ica-
tions of citizens to assure that the classifications are 
reasonable where fundamental rights are affected. The govern-
ment must show a substantial and compelling reason for the 
1 'f' t' 259 c assi l.ca ion. 
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by itself and in conjuction with the due process clause 
has been used as a basis for treatment. 260 In Nason the 
258 
16 Am.Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law § 488. 
259Halpern, supra, p. 393. Se also Chambers, Altern-
atives to Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill--Practical 
Guides and Constitutional Imperatives, Michigan Law Review, 
1972, 2.Q_, 1107. 
260 . . d f 'd . Nason v. Su erlnten ent o Brr gewater State Hospit-
al, 233 N_E. 2a· O Mass! 9 Nason, c arge w t mur er, 
was found incompetent to stand trial ~nd was committed to 
the Bridgewater Hospital in Massachusetts, On petition for 
release he urged that the hospital was understaffed and that 
treatment was so inferior to other hospitals in the state that 
his confinement there denied him equal protection of the law. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Court held that Nason's confinement 
did not satisfy the promise of treatment and the lack of treat-
ment created substantial risk of violating the equal pro-
tection clause. If adequate efforts were not made to improve 
Nason's condition within a reasonable period, the legality of 
Nason's further confinement was questionable.) 
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Supreme Court of Massachusetts held: 
If ... treatment is not available on a reasonable, 
nondiscrimina.troy basis, there is a substantial 
risk that constitutional requirements of equal 
protection of the laws will not be satisfied. 
Differences in treatment may be justified by 
differences in particular cases, but should be 261 
reasonably related to the varying circumstances. · 
Reliance upon the equal protection clause has been criticized 
in that instead of requiring all staffs in a given state to 
meet the standards of the best hospital, it only requires 
equality among all. This penalizes those states which have 
made some progress and leaves unchanged uniformly poor con-
d . . . h 262 itions in ot er states. This criticism, however, ignores 
the possible broader spectrum of the court's ruling which 
would require that the mentally ill or mentally deficient 
receive the same quality of treatment as persons suffering 
from physical ailments or the same as mentally deficient per-
sons in private facilities. 26 3 
261 
Id. 
262 
Goodman,S.M., Right to Treatment: The Responsibility 
of the Courts, The Georgetown Law Journal, 1969, 57, 680, 
690-691. 
263 
Murdock, c.w., Civil Rights of the Mentally Retarded: 
Some Critical Issues, Notre Dame Lawyer, 1972, 48, 133, 160. 
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Eighth Amendment 
Another constitutional basis for treatment is the pro-
hibition of the Eighth Amendment against cruel and unusual 
punishment: 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive 
fines impo~~~, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted. 
Courts have traditionally restricted its application to crim-
inal defendants. In Wyatt, however, the court held that 
since confinement of a mentally ill or mentally retarded 
person deprives him of liberty until he is "cured", failure 
to provide necessary treatment so that the person be releas-
ed constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Application of 
the Eighth Amendment was used to require treatment in a 
265 
recent California case, People v. Feagley. In Feagley 
the defendant was convicted of simple battery as the result 
of stroking the hair and necks of two young girls. The 
crime was a misdemeanor punishable by 30 days of imprison-
ment. However because Feagley had engaged in similar activ-
ities in the past he was also convicted for violation of 
California's sexual offender statute. As a consequence he 
was sentenced to a special colony for sexual of fenders at 
264 
U.S. Const. amend. VIII. 
265 
14 Cal.3d 338, 121 Cal.Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373 
(1975}. 
v 
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the state penitentiary. He received no psychiatric treat-
ment and sought release under a writ of habeas corpus. 266 
The California court held that Feagley's incarceration with-
out adequate treatment constituted cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 267 Feagley was 
a convicted prisoner, but the Wyatt court recognized that 
the mentally disabled, including the mentally retarded, are 
in effect punished for being mentally ill or retarded and 
given indefinite sentences until "cured". Failure to pro-
vide treatment so that the "sentence" may be ended and lib-
erty restored is cruel and unusual punishment. 
266
writ of habeas corpus--called the great writ, means 
literally "let us have the body 9 • It is frequently used by 
prisoners and civilly committed mentally ill and mentally 
retarded to obtain release from confinement on the grounds 
that they are being wrongfully held. 
267People v. Feagley, supra. Comment: The Eighth 
Amendment Right to Treatment for Involuntarily Committed 
Mental Patients, Iowa Law Review, 1976, 61, 1057. In its 
ruling in Feagley, the court relied in part on Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (Defendant was arrested after 
police officers observed needle marks on his arm and was 
convicted of drug addiction. The court held that drug 
addiction is a status as is mental illness. The imposition 
of punishment for a status violates the Eighth Amendment.) 
But see Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (Defendant was 
arrested for public intoxication and his conviction was 
affirmed, despite the fact he was an alcoholic, on the 
grounds that he could have avoided the criminal .act by 
drinking at home. Therefore he was convicted for the pro-
hibited act of drunkeness and not his status of being an 
alcoholic. ) 
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Thirteenth Amendment 
Another constitutional basis for treatment, although 
somewhat limited, is the Thirteenth Amendment. 
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except 
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall 
have been duly c~g~icted, shall exist within the 
United States ••. 
Although the immediate aim of the amendment was the abolition 
of slavery, the amendment has been construed by the courts to 
require maintenance of a free and voluntary labor force. 269 
A recent case held that if a mentally retarded person can 
prove 1) that he was required to perform work involuntarily 
because of his mental condition and 2) the chores had no 
therapeutic prupose, but were performed solely to assist in 
defraying institutional costs, he may establish violation of 
the Thirteenth Arnendment. 270 The defendants argued that 
all involuntary civil commitment serves a compelling state 
interest in protecting society from the mentally retarded so 
that the question of whether or not the work was therapeutic 
was irrelevant. Their argument was rejected. 
268 U.S. Const. amend. XIII. 
269 1 k ·11· 322 4 (1944) Po lac v. Wi iams, U.S. . 
270weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F.Supp. 445 (E.D. Wis. 
197 4) • 
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While the decision in Weidenfeller does not hold that 
the Thirteenth Amendment specifically requires treatment for 
the mentally retarded, it does establish that the mentally 
retarded must not be compelled to perform work that is non-
therapeutic. Limitations on what kinds of work activities 
patients of mental heal.th facilities may be required to per-
form have been imposed in several decisions which have re-
271 quired minimum treatment. 
Statutory Bases 
A fourth basis for treatment is statutory, including 
1) state statutes specifically requiring treatment for the 
272 institutionalized mentally retarded; 2) the Federal 
273 Civil Rights Act; and.3) the Developmentally Disabled 
271
see Davis v. Watkins, 384 F.Supp. 1196, 1208-1209 
(N.D. Oh. W.D., 1974) (Patients not required under any cir-
cumstances to perform "[r]epetitiye, non-functienal, degr.ading, 
and unnecessary tasks ... such as buffing a waxed floor that 
has already been sufficiently buffed, polishing brass, or 
shining employee's shoes." 
2721964 Hospitalization of the Mentally Ill Act, 
D.C. Code §21-562 (Supp,V., 1966) See Rouse v. Cameron, 
125 U.S. App. D.C. 366, 373 F.2d 451 (1966). 
27 342 USC §1981 (1871). 
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Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. 274 
Rouse v. Cameron, one of the earliest cases to deal 
with the right to adequate treatment, suggested that there 
might be a constitutional basis for treatment as discussed 
earlier. The court's finding for the plaintiff however was 
specifically based on a District of Columbia statute: 
A person hospitalized in a public hospital for a 
mental illness shall, during his hospitalization, 
be entitled to medical and psychiatric care and 
treatment. The administrator of each public 
hospital shall keep records detailing all medi~~~ 
and psychiatric care and treatment received ••. 
Rouse was charged with a misdemeanor and found not 
guilty by reason of insanity and committed. Punishment for 
the crime was one year. Rouse had been institutionalized 
for four years, and sought release under a writ of habeas 
corpus because he contended he was not receiving adequate 
treatment. The trial judge refused to consider the question 
of adequate treatment stating that he could decide whether 
his treatment was adequate. The lower court trial judge 
dismissed Rouse's request for release. The appellate court, 
in an opinion by Judge David Bazelon, reversed the lower 
court's action and remanded the case to the trial judge to 
hear expert testimony and determine whether or not Rouse's 
treatment was adequate. 
274 42USC §6001 (1975) • 
275 Rouse v. Cameron, supra; D.C. Code §21-562, supra. 
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As discussed earlier, Oregon statutes provide that a 
person found not guilty of a crime by reason of a mental 
disease or defect may be committed if he needs care, super-
276 
vision or treatment, or in the case of the mentally 
d d d . . 277 retar e --care, custo y or training. Unlike the Washing-
ton D.C. statute, treatment is not specified for the mentally 
retarded. 278 However it appears implicit that the committed 
mentally retarded have a right to treatment since 1) they 
will not be released until ''cured" or no longer in need of 
care, custody or training, and 2) courts have indicated that 
mere custodial care is insufficient. There are no Oregon 
cases on point, and unfortunately for the committed mentally 
retarded person seeking treatment, the Oregon statutes are 
not as explicit in requiring treatment as are those of the 
District of Columbia. 
276 
ORS 161. 340. 
277 
ORS 427.015. 
278A mentally ill person in Oregon has a statutory 
right to have a written treatment plan. ORS 426.385(g). 
The mentally retarded lack such statutory protection. 
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A second statutory basis for treatment is the Federal 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, which provides: 
Every person who under color of any statute •.• of 
any State ••. subjects, or causes to be subjected 
any citizen of the United States or other person 
within the jurisdiction, thereof, to the deprivation 
of any rights, privileges or inununities secured by th279 Constitution, shall be liable to the party injured ••. 
The statute is essentially a codification of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. It is important to the mentally retarded seeking 
treatment because it specifies that if the mentally retarded 
is denied treatment and can convince the court that he had a 
statutory right to treatment he may receive money damages. 
Plaintiff in Donaldson v. O'Connor 280 sought money damages 
under the Civil Rights Act from two physicians at a mental 
health facility for their failure to either provide treat-
ment or release him. Donaldson had been confined in a Florida 
State Hospital for the mentally ill against his will for 
nearly 15 years and had repeatedly demanded release claiming 
he was dangerous to no one and at any rate was receiving no 
treatment. At numerous times friends and once a halfway house 
agreed to provide Donaldson any care he might require, but 
he was not released and continued receiving only custodial 
care. At the trial the trial judge instructed the 
27942USC §1983. 
280see Annot. Right to Relief Under Federal Civil 
Rights Act of 1871 for Alleged Wrongful Conunitment to or 
Confinement in Mental Hospital. American Law Reports Federal, 
1973, 16, 440. 
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jury that O'Connor violated Donaldson's civil rights under 
the statute if Donaldson was eonfined against his will, was 
not dangerous to himself or others and was not receiving 
treatment. The jury awarded Donaldson money damages totalling 
$48,500. O'Connor appealed to the Fifth Circuit of Appeals 
which affirmed the judgment and held thata .. person confined 
ag~inst his will in a state mental insitution has a "constit-
utional right to receive such treatment as will give him a 
reasonable opportunity to be cured or improve his mental 
d 't' i,281 con 1 ion. 
The U.S. Supreme Court essentially affirmed the judg-
ment of the jury at the trial leve1282 but vacated the broad 
sweeping opinion of the appellate court and simply held that 
a state cannot constitutionally confine a nondangerous person 
28·1 
393 F.2d 507, 520. 
2.82 
O'Connor argued that he was not liable for money 
damages because he was acting in good faith in reliance on 
state law. The trial judge instructed the jury that O'Connor 
would not be liable if he believed in good faith that Donald-
son's continued confinement was proper. The Supreme Court 
remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to decide whether 
the instruction effectively informed the jury that O'Connor 
would only be liable under the civil rights act if he knew 
or should have known that the action he took within his sphere 
of official responsibilities, would violate Donaldson's 
constititutional rights or if he took action with the mal-
icious intent of violating Donaldson's civil rights. 
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capable of living in freedom by himse·lf or with the help of 
family and friends. Since the jury found that O'Connor 
knowingly confined Donaldson, its judgment was affirmed. 
The court sidestepped the issue, however, of whether there 
was a constitutional right to treatment. 
Specifically, there is no reason now to decide whether 
mentally ill persons dangerous to themselves or others 
have a right to treatment upon compulsory confinement 
by the State, or whether the State may compulsorily 
confine a nondangerous, m~~gally ill individual for 
the purpose of treatment. 
As a result of the Donaldson case, there is no Supreme Court 
authority that there is a constitutional right to treatment, 
nor conversely is there Supreme Court authority that there 
is no constitutional right to treatment. · Donaldson does 
stand for the proposition that the mentally retarded or men-
tally ill person who believes that his constitutional right 
to treatment is violated may raise the issue by seeking money 
damages under the Federal Civil Rights Act. As a result of 
the Supreme Court's ruling in Donaldson, cases such as Wyatt 
are still viable rules of law in the jurisdictions involved 
and may be persuasive authority in other jurisdictions such 
as Oregon for the proposition that there is a constitutional 
right to treatment, but the decisions would not be binding 
on Oregon courts as a ruling by the U.S. Supreme Court would 
have been. 
283 
422 U.S. 563, 669. 
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Another statutory basis for treatment is the Develop-
mentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. 284 
Essentially the Act provides that in order for a state to 
receive part of the 50 millia.n dollars allocated to con-
struction, remodeling or alteration of facilities for the 
developmentally disabled, the state must provide the federal 
government with satisfactory assurances that it has implemented 
a habilitati6n plan for each mentally disabled person, set-
ting forth the objectives and manner of achievement as well 
as a provision for an annual review of each treatment plan. 
In addition the act requires that the Secretary of Health, 
Education and Welfare promulgate regulations setting forth 
the kinds of services needed by the developmentally disabled 
and standards as to the scope and quality of the services:S 5 
Congress also made specific findings concerning the rights of 
persons with developmental disabilities: 
1) persons with developmental disabilities have a right 
to appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation for such 
disabilities; 
284 
42 use §6001-6001. 
285 
42 USC §6009. The regulations have been proposed 
but have not yet been adopted. 
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2) the treatment, services, and habilitation for a 
person with developmental disabilities should be designed 
to maximi.ze the developmental potential of the person and 
should be provided in the setting that is least restrictive 
to the person's personal liberty. 
While the United States may not bring an action to 
require state facilities to comply with the act, the act does 
not restrict the rights of the individual to bring an action 
on his own. 28 6 In addition the act specifically requires that 
States seeking funds under the act develop and maintain an 
independent advocacy system to pursue legal, administrative 
and other appropriate remedies to insure protection of the 
rights of persons receiving treatment, services, or habilita-
tion within the State. 287 
It is impossible to predict the success of the act in 
securing habilitation for the mentally retarded. The act's 
success or failure will depend upon the regulations finally 
adopted and the parameters of the act as established by 
administrative hearings and legal actions brought by the ad-
vocacy system required under the act as well as actions brought 
by individual mentally retarded persons. 
286 
u.s. v. Solomon, 419 F.Supp. 358 (D.Md. 1976). 
287 
42 use §6012. 
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Negligence· and Breach of contract 
In addition to constitutional and statutory bases for 
treatment, a mentally retarded person may have a cause of 
action against the state, treating physician, psychologists, 
psychiatrists or the superintendent or director of the mental 
health facility for negligence in failing to provide adequate 
treatment. If successful he will be awarded money damages. ·288 
In Bartlett v. New York289 plaintiff charged the state with 
negligence in failing to release him from a state mental 
health facility after he had been involuntarily committed 
37 years earlier as having "simple or low level schizophrenia" 
288 
Schwitzgebel,R., The Right to Effective Mental Treat-
ment, supra, 936. The author notes that if a patient 
enters a mental hospital and does not leave or if treated 
and untreated patients do equally well in the facility, 
it is obvious that the patient has not been receiving proper 
treatment. In medical malpractice cases, the courts use 
the doctrine of res ipsa losruitur (the thing speaks for 
itself) to create a presumption of negligence against the 
doctor in causing injury to the patient. The defendants who 
are in a better position to know must explain the reason 
for the treatment given. In cases brought by the mentally 
retarded for non-treatment, the mentally r.etarded person 
would only need to show that his condition has hot improved 
despite his commitment to a mental health facility. It 
would then be incumbent upon the state or the treating 
physician or psychologist to show that the mentally retarded 
person had received adequate treatment but because of his 
condition, treatment was of no value or as a result of the 
treatment given satisfactory improvement had occurred. 
289 
No. 340/1976, N.Y. Supreme Court, App. Div. 
(May 28, 1976). 
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despite his frequent requests that he be released because 
he was receiving no treatment. The trial court dismissed 
the claim on the ground that the state hospital was exer-
cising professional judgment. Because it was making dis-
cretionary choices concerning the type, if any, of the treat-
ment to provide the plaintiff it could not be liable. 290 
However on appeal the appellate court reversed: 
The wrong committed by refusing such release is not 
the result of the exercise of a professional judg-
ment, but of total indifference and neglect to duty. 
~uch ~ond~~t removes the protection of governmental 
immunity. 
The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court to 
determine the amount of the patient•s damages based upon the 
length of time he was ready, willing and able to be released 
without danger to the community. The court did not specify 
what kind of treatment the patient was entitled to receive 
but only that he was entitled to treatment: 
[A]lthough there may not be complete unanimity of 
opinion as to what treatment to extend to the patient; 
there can be no doubt that if the patient is detained 
because of m~~2al illness, some treatment must be 
offered him. 
290 . Originally the State and its employees could not be 
sued because of governmental or sovereign immunity. Most 
states including Oregon and the federal government have now 
passed tort claims acts which permit the government and its 
employees to be sued. However the State and its employees 
are not liable for discretionary decisions involving matters 
of policy nor for matters of professional judgment. ORS 30.150. 
291Bartlett v. New York, supra. 
292 
Id. 
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While Bartlett involved a mentally ill patient, the 
court's ruling would be equally applicable to a mentally 
retarded patient. However a difficulty pointed up by the 
case is the fact that the state and its employees are not 
liable for negligently making or failing to make policy 
decisions or in negligently making professional judgments. 
Consequently it may be difficult for the mentally retarded 
person to recover from the state or its employees for his 
non-treatment. For example, in Baker v. Straumfjord,293 
the Oregon Court of Appeals held that a state employed 
physician at the Oregon State University infirmiry was not 
liable for injuries sustained by a mentally disturbed patient 
who leaped from a third floor window of the university 
infirmiry. Plaintiff alleged that as a patient he had not 
been adequately restrained or supervised. The court held 
that the physician was immune from liability because his 
decision concerning the care of the patient was based on 
professional judgment with which the court would not inter-
fere. 
Based on Baker it is unlikely that an Oregon court 
would hold the state or one of its employees liable in 
damages for negligently failing to provide a patient with 
29-3 
10 Or.App. 414, 500 P.2d 496 (1972}. 
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adequate treatment, unless the court were to have a case 
before it like Bartlett in which a total indifference and 
neglect to duty is shown. Until the court alters its 
application of the discretionary function defense to pro-
fessional judgment or until the Oregon Tort Claims Act is 
amended by the legislature, liability for negligence is 
possible but not probable as a basis for treatment in Oregon. 
It has also been suggested that a patient at a mental 
health facility might be entitled to recover damages when he 
has not received adequate treatment, under a breach of con-
tract theory.294 This theory has been used sparingly in 
practice because there is usually no oral or written agree-
ment between the psychologist and the patient. The benefits 
of having a contract have been outlined by Alexander and 
Szasz: 
[I]t seems likely that while more precise definitions 
of the psychiatrist's contractual powers and limit-
ations would curtail some of current psychiatric 
practices, it would expand others, by removing the 
presently justified fears of many persons to sacrifice 
their autonomy and yield to the total discretion of 
the psychiatrist. 295 
294 
Schwitzgebel, R., The Right to Effective Mental 
Treatment, supra, 951. 
295 
Alexander & Szasz,T., From Contract to Status via 
Psychiatry, Santa Clara Law Review, 1973, 13, 537, 555. 
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The use of contracts for treatment would clearly define the 
expectations of the patient and the obligations of the 
psychologists or pyschiatrist. The use of contracts has 
been effective in a mental health clinic in Florida2-96 and 
at the Elahan Clinic in Vancouver, Washington.297 The con-
tracts specify treatment to be given and goals to be accomp-
lished, encouraging patient participation. They do not 
however provide for money damages. 
Several difficulties restrict implementation of 
contracts as a basis for treatment. First, despite the sup-
port advocated by professionals in the mental health field 
such as Thomas Szasz, it is questionable whether a psychologist, 
or psychiatrist would want to enter into a contract which 
would limit his flexibility in treating the person or in 
agreeing in advance of treatment to specific results. Secondly, 
the patient after agreeing to treatment might subsequently 
refuse further treatment as he has a right to do.298 This 
296 
Lombilla, Kiresak & Sherman, Evaluating a Community 
Mental Health Program: Contract Fulfillment Analysis, 
Hospital and Community Psychiatry, 1973, 24, 760. 
297 
Casey,W., Director of Elahan (lecture, Portland 
State University, Feb., 1977). 
298 
Friedman,P.R. Legal Regulations of Applied Behavior 
Analysis, Mental Institutions and Prisons, Arizona Law 
Review, 1975, 17, 40. 
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would amount to a breach of contract by the mentally retarded 
person, but the psychologist or psychiatrist might not 
receive payment for any treatment already provided. 
A major difficulty with the contract basis for treat-
ment is that mentally retarded persons may be considered 
incompetent to enter into a contract. Under the common law 
they are deemed incompetent persons and are protected from 
contracting for services to restore their condition. 299 In 
Oregon a person must have sufficient mental capacity to under-
stand the nature of the business he is engaging in or he will 
not be able to enter into a contract. 300 There would be 
nothing however, to prevent a psychiatrist, psychologist, 
or mental health facility from entering into a contract with 
the patient's family, guardian or friends for treatment and 
thereby provide a clear basis for determining the specific 
rights of both the patient and the psychologist or psy-
chiatrist. 
299 
Schwitzgebel,R., The Right to Effective Mental 
Treatment, surpa, 953. 
300 
Gindhart v. Skourtes, supra. Limitations on the 
mentally retarded person's right to enter into contracts is 
discussed in Chapter III. 
129 
JUSTICIABILITY OF "ADEQUATE" TREATMENT CONTROVERSY 
Opponents to judicial requirements that treatment be 
offered to the mentally disabled have argued that the pro-
vision of treatment in not a justiciable controversy.301 
Merely because there is a legal basis for treatment does not 
mean that a court will intervene by examining whether or not 
appropriate treatment has been given. The controversy must 
be appropriate for judicial scrutiny or a court will not 
review it.302 In deciding whether or not the controversy 
is justiciable the courts consider three basic issues: 1) 
whether judicially discoverable and manageable standards exist 
for determining the rights of the parties; 2) whether a 
judicial determination will amount to an interference with 
31!ll 
Burnham v. Dept. of Public Health, 349 F.Supp. 1335 
{N.D. Ga. 1972), reversed, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Circ. 1974) 
(Trial court held that it could not and should not become 
involved in the right to treatment issue. The court held 
that the judiciary was unable to determine what was adequate 
treatment because the definitions of psychiatric treatment 
were too broad. The judge was also of the opinion that there 
was no constitutionally recognized right to treatment. Finally, 
he determined that any attempt to ascertain the adequacy of 
treatment is best left to the state courts. The judg~'s 
decision was reversed on appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals which held that there was a constitutional right 
to treatment and the adequacy was appropriate for review in 
the courts whether state or federal. 
302 
Shuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 {2nd Circ. 1969). 
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decisions by other branches of government; and 3) whether 
th ·d d l' f 303 e courts can provi e a equate re ie . 
The defendants in Wyatt suggested that since even 
experts in mental health could not agree on minimum stand-
ards, the best approach would be for courts to defer to the 
judgment of involved professionals. They also argued that 
the establishment of policing of individual treatment plans 
should not be undertaken by a court and that a court could 
not choose among the vast array of psychotherapies. As they 
observed, the proper therapy or habilitation plan for one 
patient might be contraindicated by another. Defendant 
Governor George Wallace of Alabama also argued that 1) the 
court's action would require allocations of funds and other 
fiscal decisions which we~e the province of the Alabama 
Legislature and not the courts and 2) the real purpose of 
mental health facilities was to relieve friends and family 
of their custodial duties in attempting to care for the 
mentally deficient, and accordingly custodial care was all 
th t . d 304 a was require • 
303 
Comment: Wyatt v. Stickney and the Right of Civilly 
Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, Harvard 
Law Review, 1973, 86, 1282, 1296. 
304 
Wyatt v. Aderholt, supra. 
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The court in Wyatt held, however, that the controversy 
was proper for the courts. A judge is not required to choose 
one treatment over another, and the court will simply review 
the treatment offered to assure that a number of habilitation 
alternatives are available. Treatment is required by the 
U.S. Constitution and not mere custodial care, so, having 
undertaken to pro~ide facilities for the mentally deficient 
and permitting their involuntary connnitment to these facil-
ities, the state must allocate sufficient funds to provide 
adequate habilitation. 305 
SUMMARY 
There are several legal bases for treatment or habil-
i tation of the mentally retarded--constitutional, statutory 
and connnon law tort and contract theories. No single theory 
has become dominant, and further litigation can be expected. 
There is, however, a legal right to treatment which has been 
recognized by many courts, and those courts have determined 
305
offer,c.w., Field Report, Psychology Today, 1974, 
61. (The author reviews Wyatt and notes that for some 
attorneys Wyatt and suits of its type are a stop gap measure 
with the ultimate goal closure of the institutions. Those 
attorneys and mental health professionals believe that 
adequate treatment within a large iastitution is by defini-
tion impossible. As a result many are proposing utilization 
of connnunity based facilities.) 
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that the issue of whether or not treatment is adequate is 
appropriate for judicial review. Perhaps even more signif-
icant than judicial opinions is legislation, especially the 
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. 
Section 113 of the act requires that each state receiving 
formula grants for developmental disabilities' services 
must have an independent system for the protection and 
advocacy of the rights of persons receiving such aid by 
October 1, 1977. Implementation of these systems of 
advocacy may do much to secure the mentally retarded's right 
to treatment. 
It has been suggested that the most effective method 
of providing treatment is through legislation rather than 
1 . . . 305 . 1 . . t b. h h' f 1t1gat1on. Legis ation is no su Ject to t e w ims o 
individual judges and is not controlled by the particular 
facts before the court. This kind of limitation is well 
illustrated by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Donald-
son306 in which the court restricted its holding to the rights 
of an individual who was not dangerous to himself and others 
and who had friends and relatives willing to provide for his 
care simply because that was the posture of the case before 
the court and it made its holding as restrictive as possible. 
305 h b"l' . h Re a 1 1tat1on Researc 
Mental Retardation, Monograph 94, 
of Oregon, 1976. 
306 
and Training Center in 
Eugene, Oregon: University 
Donaldson v. O'Connor, supra. 
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It may be argued that since courts have recognized that there 
is a right to treatment and that the courts are competent 
and constitutionally authorized to evaluate the treatment 
given, it is now incumbent upon legislators to enact 
legislation providing for the right to treatment with some 
specificity. Additionally, almost all of the cases 
have concerned mentally retarded patients in state facilities. 
This has occurred because many of the legal bases discussed 
earlier require some type of state action. Legislatures 
need not be so restricted and may enact legislation securing 
treatment for noninstitutionalized mentally retarded persons 
who have or may suffer a deprivation of liberty. 
Whether these rights are secured by judicial opinion 
or legislation there is a need for an interdisciplinary 
approach with psychologists providing appropriate guidelines. 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
Psychologists have generally accepted the normaliza-
tion principle and the court in wyatt v. Stickney has issued 
orders in an attempt to implement it in an institutional 
setting. There is no judicial opinion of national impact, 
such as a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, accepting the 
normalization principle. In fact, the Supreme Court refused 
to hold either that the mentally retarded do have a constitu-
tional right to treatment or that they do not. This chapter 
will examine the present legal provisions for treatment and 
the countervailing pressures in the push toward deinstitution-
alization and least restrictive alternative. The prospect 
of legislation as a more feasible approach for securing 
effective treatment for the mentally .retarded is discussed 
and recommendations are made. 
LEGAL PROVISIONS IN OREGON 
By statute Oregon has established state hospitals for 
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treatment of the mentally ill, 307 and for the 11 care and 
training" of the mentally deficient. 308 The statutes relat-
ing to the mentally ill do not specify the kind of treat-
ment to be provided but only that the person may be dis-
charged when he is no longer mentally ill.309 The mentally 
ill person who has been conunitted does have a right l} to 
have a written treatment plan, 2) to be kept current with 
his progress, and 3) to have some protection from the use of 
potentially unusual or hazardous procedures and mechanical 
restraints as discussed in Chapter rv. 310 These rights are 
not insured by statute for the retarded. The mentally retard-
ed person whether involuntarily conunitted or voluntarily 
admitted will only be discharged when he is no longer a "fit 
subject for institutionalization 11 • 311 The statute is unclear, 
as is the legislative history of the kind and quality of 
treatment to be provided, if any, to the patients. An 
307 
ORS 426.010. 
3080RS 427.010. 
3090RS 426.300. 
3100RS 426.385. 
3110RS 427.250. 
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indication of the kind of treatment the legislature deems 
adequate may be found in the delineation of services which, 
by statute, are to be provided out-patients at the state 
facilities. These services include diagnostic services, 
advice and other "necessary 11 services. 312 What constitutes 
necessary services is unclear. Arguments could be made that 
it is mere custodial care. A review of psychological lit-
erature, would indicate that necessary services means all 
tested methods of achieving normalization. Legislative 
amendment or judicial clarification are required. 
Oregon statutes require special education for handi-
capped children in addition to regular classes--special 
classes, special schools, special services, home instruction 
or hospital instruction. 313 Handicapped children include 
mentally retarded children under age 21. 314 
The standards for determining adequacy of instruction 
are not specified in the statutes. Oregon statutes provide 
for a State Advisory Councel for Handicapped Children, com-
posed of parents and educators of handicapped children, which 
advises the Superintendent of Public Instruction and the State 
Board of Education on the sprcial education programs. 315 
I 
3120RS 427.106. 
313 
ORS 343. 035 (3), 221. 
314 
ORS 343.035(2). 
3150RS 343.287. 
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Administrative agency regulations promulgated by the 
Oregon Department of Education provide for hearing procedures 
to be followed prior to a child's placement in a different 
educational program. The hearing procedures require notice, 
and afford the parents the right to be represented by an 
attorney, and to present testimony at the hearing. There 
are also administrative regulations concerning the minimum 
education standards for state institutions serving the men-
tally retarded. 316 
Oregon statutes and regulations provide for care, 
training and education but are far from outlining a plan for 
habilitation such as the following proscribed in Wyatt: 
1. Residents shall have a right to habilitation, in-
cluding medical treatment, education and care, suited 
to their needs regardless of age, degree of retardation 
or handicapping condition. 
2. Each resident has a right to a habilitation program 
which will maximize his human abilities and enhance his 
ability to cope with his environment. The institution 
shall recognize that each resident, regardless of ability 
or status, is entitled to develop and realize his fullest 
potential. The institution shall implement the prin-
ciple of normalization so that each resident may live 
as normally as possible. 
* * * 
3.c. Residents shall have a right to the least 
restrictive conditions necessary to achieve the 
pruposes of habilitation. To this end, the instit-
ution shall make every attempt to move residents 
316 
OAR 581-15-110. 
from (1) more to less structured living; (2) larger 
to smaller facilities1 (3) larger to smaller living 
units; (4) group to individual residence: {5) seg-
regated from the community to integrated into t~I7 
community; (6) dependent to independent living. 
DEINSTITUTIONAL!ZATION 
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As a result of decisions such as Wyatt and various 
articles by mental health professionals there is an increas-
ing emphasis toward deinstitutionalization. Wyatt and cases 
like it have set high standards requiring individualized 
treatment, reasonable staff/patient ratios and certain min-
imal living conditions. The high cost and responsibility of 
maintaining the institutions has led many states to establish 
group homes in community settings. Also based upon the prin-
ciple of normalization and deinstitutionalization mental 
health professionals have advocated use of group homes in the 
community.318 Four problems may be seen as possible impediments 
317
wyatt v. Stickney, supra, 396. 
318 
Courts, which are given through statutes or judicial 
opinions alternatives to commitment, are often unaware of the 
alternative kinds of placement available. Mental health pro-
fessionals must act as promoters for community care and as-
sure that explorations for alternatives actually occur. It 
has also been suggested that courts employ a staff member to 
advise them of the various alternatives available. Alter-
native To Mental Hospital Treatment, Hospital and Community 
Psychiatry, 1976, 27(4), 186, 187. The Multnomah County Public 
Defender's Office has an alternative worker assigned to every 
attorney representing mentally ill or retarded clients. 
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in the move toward deinstitutionalization: 1) there is oon-
siderable pressure from lobbyists for labor unions and state 
employees to keep the institutions operating; 319 2} the 
conununity may not welcome mentally retarded into the neigh-
borhood to live in a group home and may enact zoning laws to 
restrict occupancy; 3) as discussed in Chapter I, the mentally 
retarded are a very diverse group and there may be more op-
portunity to work with and be instructed with other mentally 
retarded persons with comparable development and intelligence 
in a large institution rather than a smaller group home; 320 
and 4) funding affects what theory is implemented or legis-
lation applied. 
Construction of large mental health facilities can mean 
more jobs for workers. Group homes would also, but unions 
tend to favor construction on large projects, 321 and 
state employees are reluctant to lose jobs at the institutions. 
319 
In California where the state had begun to close 
institutions in favor of group homes, lobbyists forced the 
state to reverse itself and institutions are no longer being 
closed. 
320 
Tarjan,G., Wright,s.w., Eyman,R,K. & Kenan,c.v., 
Natural History of Mental Retardation; Some Aspects of 
Epidimiolo9y, American Journal of Mental Deficiency. 1973, 
77(4), 369, 373, 
321 
Blatt,B., The Executive,in Changing Patterns in 
Residential Services for the Mental! Retarded(Rev.ed.) Kugel, 
R.B. & S earer,A. ed. Washiwgton,D.C.: President's Conunittee 
on Mental Retardation., 1976. 
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As noted in Chapter IV, the action in Wyatt V. · Stickney was 
originally begun by a group of disgruntled state employees. 
Interestingly, as a part of its judgment the court directed 
the employment of 300 additional state employed staff 
workers. 322 As a result, legislators and elected judges have 
even more constituents who may be seeking maintenance of the 
institution because of the jobs it affords. 
The fact that a small residential care facility is 
moving into the community is in keeping with the theories of 
normalization and least restrictive alternative treatment, but 
may not be in keeping with what some of the residents believe 
is appropriate for their community. Traditionally urban com-
munities have zoning ordinances which only permit one or pos-
sibly two family dwellings in a neighborhood and those families 
323 
must be related. As a result local governments and some 
courts have compared a family care home for the mentally re-
tarded to a boarding house and required that it be located in 
. 1 324 a commercia zone. Most zoning ordinances also allow for 
322 
Gilhoal,T.K., The Use:s of Courts and of Lawyers, in 
Changing Patterns, supra. 
323 
Chandler,J.A. & Ross,s.,Jr., Zoning Restrictions and 
the R;lght To Live in the community, in The Mentally Retarded 
Citizen and the Law, supra. 
324 
Id. 
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variances from the comprehensive zoning plan or conditional 
use permits to permit construction or occupancy in an other-
wise inappropriate zone if it is compatible with existing use. 
However because of the possibly harmful effect on land values, 
such variances are difficult to obtain. 
It has been suggested that the zoning problem might be 
alleviated by requiring the owner to first obtain a license to 
operate a group home. The granting of the license might de-
pend on such factors as a "planned treatment" program, adequate 
supervision, and a program to obtain community acceptance. 325 
This kind of legislation, or recognition that "family" may 
entail more than relatives, together with a program of com-
munity education and awareness could help alleviate this zon-
ing problem. 
The availability of funds determines the kind of program 
available. This paper· has not presented any kind of economic 
cost analysis comparing the cost of operating a group home 
with a large institution. 326 However, as discussed in Chapter 
4, Governor Wallace in Wyatt v. Stickney argued that the State 
325 
Kressel,L. 1 The Coi:nmunity Residence Movement: La.nd 
Use Conflicts and Planning Imperatives, New York University 
Review of Law and Social Chan;l'e, 1975, V(2), 137. 
326 
See Boggs,E.M.; Quality Control of Coi:nmunity Services, 
in Mentally Retarded Citizen and the Law, supra. 
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of Alabama could not afford the kind of treatment that the 
experts testified was required. The court in Wyatt held that 
the adequacy of funding was no excuse for failing to provide 
adequate treatment. Also the availability of federal funds 
under the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of 
Rights Act may be of considerable impact in this area as 
discussed in Chapter IV. 
LEAST RESTRICTIVE ALTERNATIVES 
Whether in large institutions or in group homes there 
is a growing consensus that the mentally retarded are en-
titled to habilitation in the least restrictive setting , how-
ever the consensus has thus far been restricted to the insti-
tutionalized mentally retarded. As pointed out in Chapter I, 
a large number of mentally retarded are not institutionalized; 
but, as discussed in Chapter III, their liberty has been 
restricted by such legal devices as guardianship. It has 
been suggested in the area of guardianship that under the 
least restrictive alternative a guardian should only be 
appointed for those specific things that the mentally retarded 
cannot do for himself. 327 
327 
Gearheart & Litton, supra. 
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Perhaps the least restrictive alternative could be 
carried an additional step to require that the guardian re-
ceive assistance in planning the education and activities of 
his mentally retarded ward utilizing the principles of norm-
alization. Neither the legislatures nor the courts have 
taken any strong action to expand the theories of normal-
ization and least restrictive alternative to the non-
institutionalzied mentally retarded. 
LITIGATION VS. LEGISLATION 
Both the legislatures and the courts have been active 
in law for the mentally retarded, especially the institution-
alized. As stated earlier, the 1960's era was one of legis-
lation while the 1970's has been one of litigation. But 
litigation has recently been criticized for the following 
reasons: 1) it is expensive to hire the attorneys and expert 
witnesses and to conduct a thorough investigation; 2) a final 
determination by a judge could take two to three years; 3) 
the decision is usually restricted to the facts before the 
court and not a universal rule such as the legislature might 
enact; 4) the mentally retardeds' opposi tion--us.ually the 
state--has appeared in litigated cases with more frequency 
and better financing, and thus might be better prepared: 
and 5) the court may be lacking resources and expertise to 
144 
carry out any treatment plan it might impose. 328 
Test case litigation has been a catalyst in generating 
heightened public concern for the mentally retarded, but it 
appears that we are now returning to an era of legislation. 
Legislatures can establish uniform standards, have more staff 
and finances to investigate without stifling appropriate 
experimentation, and can appropriate the funds to carry out 
1 . 1 . 329 egis ation. 
It has been suggested that all three branches of 
. 330 government working together would be effective. The 
legislatures could establish strict guidelines for adminis-
trators and provide them with necessary finances. The ad-
ministrators could run the institutions, and the courts 
328Krawles,R., Litigation vs. Legislation in The Right 
to Treatment/Habi1itation for Mentally Retarded Persons: A 
Review and Proposal, Rehabilitation, Research and Training 
Center in Mental Retardation, Eugene, Oregon, 1976; Gilhoal, 
T.K., The Uses of Courts and of Lawyers, in Kugel,R.B. & 
SFiearer ,A. (eds.) Changing Patterns in Residential Services 
for the Mentally Retarded (rev.ed.). Washington,D.C.: Pres-
ident's Committee on Mental Retardation, 1976. Gilhoal 
suggests that groups advocating the rights of the mentally 
retarded organize themsleves into litigation groups so that 
they can become repetitive litigants as are insurance 
companies, prosecuting attorneys and collection agencies. 
This would give the mentally retarded more expertise in 
litigating and more opportunity to see that the court's orders 
were carried out. 
329 Kram.bs, supra. 
33Q d. . . 1 . Johnson,R.H. & Wood,J.J.,Sr., Ju 1c1al, Legis ative, 
and Administrative Competence in Setting Institutional Stan-
dards, in The Mentally Retarded Citizen and the Law, supra. 
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could ensure that the legislative and administrative res-
ponsibilities have been satisfied. 
All branches of government work cooperatively to pro-
tect the consumer. We are living in an age of consumerism 
and even the mentally retarded citizen can be seen as a con-
sumer of services. The services are provided by the institu-
tions331 and by private mental health professionals as well. 
If the mentally retarded are seen as consumers they may be 
offered the appropriate protection afforded consumers. As 
Discussed in Chapters III and IV, the mentally retarded per-
son may be able to contract for services with the institution 
and with mental health professionals. Utilization of a con-
tract not only generates expectancy but also may give the 
mentally retarded a cause of action against the institution 
or the private person when the services are not provided. 
The law and psychology are beginning to approach 
their mutual concerns for the mentally retarded with some 
sense of cooperation and unity of purpose. Current concepts 
and applications discussed in Chapter II have implications 
for minimum treatment guidelines formulated by legislatures 
33lWyatt v. Stickney~supra. Dr. Phillis Roos, Executive 
Director for the National Association for Retarded Children 
in his testimony repeatedly referred to the mentally retarded 
as the consumers of the services offered. See also Schwitz-
gebel,R.K., The Right -to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: 
The Need for Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 
Harvard Civil Rights-civil Liberties Law Review, 1973, ~, 513. 
146 
or by the courts. For example, the fact that behavior mod-
ification can assist the mentally retarded person achieve 
normalization illustrates a need for more staffing in order 
to achieve one to one patient/staff ratios necessary in some 
behavioral therapy. However, in utilizing behavioral therapy 
care must be taken that the treatment is performed legally 
and ethically. As discussed in Chapter III, Oregon patients 
have some rights concerning use of unusual or possibly harm-
ful procedures as a part of their treatment process. Con-
seguently these legal restrictions on what may be done to 
treat the mentally retarded must be considered.33 2 In 
addition to legal constraints on utilizing certain forms of 
treatment there are certain ethical constraints such as 
informed consent of the treatment to be given. The consent 
should be based on an understanding of the procedure, 
totally voluntary and given by a competent person. 333 
332 
There is growing literature on what has been 
described as the right to avoid treatment. It is primarily 
concerned with shock tr~atments, physical deprivation, and 
forms of punishment as F-herapies for altering behavior. 
This paper does not add~ess this issue. The interested 
reader should see Sympotsium: Behavior Control, Arizona 
Law Review, 1975, 25, 1. 
333 
Guidelines for the Use of Behavior Procedures in 
M.R. Research. Arlington, Texas: National Association for 
Retarded Citizens, 1976. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS 
In light of the conclusions reached, the followi,n9 
are suggested activities for assisting the mentally retarded 
achieve habilitation: 
1) More emphasis on research of the retarded i.n the 
community, on community living versus institutionalization, 
and on special education versus integrated, mainstreamed 
classes. 
2) Development of national standards incorporating 
ideological principles of normalization, a developmental 
approach to services, consumer participation and protection 
of the mentally retarded person's lega1 and human rights. 
As discussed in Chapter I, organizations such as the National 
Association for Retarded Children and the American Association 
on Mental Deficiency have devised various standards throughout 
their existence and may be able to do so in this case. 
Additionally, Judge Johnson in Wyatt adopted specific minimal 
treatment standards for the mentally retarded which have been 
widely followed. 
3) Re-evaluation and.amendment of present laws dealing 
with the retarded concerning personal and community rights 
as outlined in Chapter III. For instance, elimination of 
special laws on contract, marriage, sterilization or adop-
tion -- in keeping with the principle of normalization could 
be effected. 
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4) Adoption of legislation giving the mentally retard-
ed a statutory right to adequate treatment in light . of current 
knowledge to meet his or her needs; provision in the statute 
for creation of a conmlittee to develop and revise minimum 
standards and to preside over a patient's challenges to the 
treatment given; establishment of a treatment monitoring 
team which will periodically review each patient's treatment 
plan to evaluate adequacy; and establishment of a manual 
which sets forth required minimum treatment levels. 
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